CC x402-creation
Monetize your agent's API or tools using the x402 protocol and USDC micropayments. Enables provisioning, earnings tracking, and withdrawals.
Monetize your agent's API or tools using the x402 protocol and USDC micropayments.
As a process C 57/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, failures and branches, consistency
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The purpose itself is risky: wallets, browser password stores, offensive security. Even an honest implementation gives the agent access to things that cost money.
Explain in the description why the access is needed and how it is limited; add tests that show refusals on dangerous requests.
How to improve
- Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 10
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 10
-
medium Risky intent
intent-wallet-secretsreferences/safety.md:5Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target1. **Private Key Isolation**: The host injects the wallet private key via `createTools({ getWalletPrivateKey })` from secure storage (e.g. env or vault). Never pass it in tool parameters visible to th -
medium Risky intent
intent-wallet-secretsSECURITY.md:13Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target- **Wallet private key**: Never exposed to the agent or in tool parameters. Supplied only by the host via `createTools({ getWalletPrivateKey })` (e.g. from env or a secure vault). -
medium Risky intent
intent-wallet-secretsSKILL.md:68Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target- **Credentials**: Wallet private key and management token are injected by the host via `createTools` only; they must never appear in tool parameters.
-
medium Risky intent
intent-wallet-secretssrc/types.ts:5Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target/** Resolve wallet private key (e.g. from env or secure vault). Required for provision_api and withdraw_funds. */
-
low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenpackage-lock.json:30High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)"integrity": "sha5…7pY+zoMV…h0x/Ptw8…8dg==",
detector -
low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenpackage-lock.json:47High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)"integrity": "sha5…b00+Gxjx…zRc/oZwU…hzA==",
detector -
low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenpackage-lock.json:115High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)"integrity": "sha512-vHk/hA7/1Ack…wbo+jaSh…Gtl+A5zq…HFg==",
detector -
low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenpackage-lock.json:149High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)"integrity": "sha5…Dsc+j03S…0oA==",
detector -
low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenpackage-lock.json:438High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)"integrity": "sha5…NS8+tHW7…WOF+PEzk…X4Q==",
detector -
low Risky intent
intent-wallet-secretsREADME.md:78Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target (detector / deny-list definition)- **Credential Injection**: Wallet private key and management token are provided only by the host through `createTools`; they must never appear in tool parameters visible to the agent.
detector
Files scanned: 17. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- warning
description-no-whendescription does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
Process rating: all ten parameters 57/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
- 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (x402-creation) differs from the folder (x402-agentic-creation)
- 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
- 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
- 100Steps. 30 steps
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 811 tokens
- medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- +4No input/output examples
- -41 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 140: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 10 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 30 items
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 64.