SKILLEMALL.ai

AF email-agent-preflight

Run the pre-flight checklist before an agent touches an inbox — the read-vs-send permission line, the injection-in-email-body threat, the send-guard rules, and the blast-radius limits that keep a compromised agent from mailing the company. Use when asked let my agent read/send email safely, set up guardrails before the agent touches my inbox, is it safe to give the agent email access, or review my email agent's permissions. Produces the permission tier, the injection defenses, the send-gate rules, and the incident kill-switch.

mohitagw15856/pm-claude-skills Agent Skills author: mohitagw15856 MIT 1 file body ≈ 1 411 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com analyzed 2 d ago

Run the pre-flight checklist before an agent touches an inbox — the read-vs-send permission line, the injection-in-email-body threat, the send-guard rules…

As a process F 49/100 · Will not run — References files that are not bundled: ../injection-spotter/SKILL.md

TemplateAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
A
90/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
99
Quality 40%
77
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
F
49/100
Will not run
References files that are not bundled: ../injection-spotter/SKILL.md
Tools and files w 18
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten
This is a copy of a skill from another catalog; the rating counts the canonical one: email-agent-preflight (mohitagw15856/pm-claude-skills)

How to improve

  1. The text references files that are not there: add them or drop the references.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 1

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 1

✓ Guard found no suspicious behaviour. 1 matches are attack strings quoted in this security skill's own documentation.

Files scanned: 1. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning missing-ref reference to a missing file: ../injection-spotter/SKILL.md

Process rating: all ten parameters 49/100

Will not run. References files that are not bundled: ../injection-spotter/SKILL.md
  • 0Tools and files. 1 referenced file(s) missing: ../injection-spotter/SKILL.md
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 34 mutating operations with no state check
  • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
  • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
  • 100Steps. 23 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1411 tokens
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low 11 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +4No input/output examples
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 532: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 13 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 23 items
  • +3Output format is stated explicitly

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 77.