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DC abusing-dpapi-for-credential-access

Extract and decrypt Windows DPAPI-protected secrets (Credential Manager, browser logins/cookies, Wi-Fi credentials, KeePass keys) online or offline using SharpDPAPI, SharpChrome, Mimikatz, or Impacket's dpapi.py, including domain-wide decryption via the DPAPI backup key. Use during authorized red-team credential-access engagements after gaining a foothold or when triaging DPAPI blobs pulled from a host.

mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills Agent Skills author: mukul975 Apache-2.0 5 files · 1 script body ≈ 2 487 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 5 d ago

Extract and decrypt Windows DPAPI-protected secrets (Credential Manager, browser logins/cookies, Wi-Fi credentials, KeePass keys) online or offline using…

As a process C 59/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, failures and branches

ProcedureGitHubSoftware developmenttype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) OpenClaw Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
D
72/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
73
Quality 40%
71
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
59/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 11

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 11
    • medium Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store references/standards.md:14
      Accesses a browser credential / cookie store (documentation of a security skill)
      | T1555.003 | Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers | Credential Access | SharpChrome decrypts DPAPI-protected browser logins/cookies. |
      security skill
    • medium Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store SKILL.md:3
      Accesses a browser credential / cookie store (documentation of a security skill)
      description: Extract and decrypt Windows DPAPI-protected secrets (Credential Manager, browser logins/cookies, Wi-Fi credentials, KeePass keys) online or offline using SharpDPAPI, SharpChrome, Mimikatz
      security skill
    • medium Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store SKILL.md:72
      Accesses a browser credential / cookie store (documentation of a security skill)
      - Extract browser saved logins and cookies with SharpChrome.
      security skill
    • medium Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store SKILL.md:141
      Accesses a browser credential / cookie store (documentation of a security skill)
      SharpChrome decrypts Chrome/Edge logins and cookies. Modern Chromium uses an App-Bound "state key" that SharpChrome resolves via DPAPI:
      security skill
    • low Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store references/api-reference.md:49
      Accesses a browser credential / cookie store (documentation table row; documentation of a security skill)
      | `cookies` | Decrypt browser cookies | `SharpChrome.exe cookies /pvk:key.pvk` |
      tablesecurity skill
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/standards.md:15
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      | T1003 | OS Credential Dumping | Credential Access | Extracting master keys and the domain backup key dumps credential material. |
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:25
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      > **Legal Notice:** This skill is for authorized penetration testing, red-team engagements, and educational purposes only. Extracting credentials from systems you do not own or lack explicit written a
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:41
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      - After compromising a Windows host where the user has saved RDP, browser, or vault credentials worth harvesting for lateral movement.
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:81
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      | T1003 | OS Credential Dumping | Credential Access | Extracting master keys / backup keys is a form of credential material dumping. |

    A further 2 matches are quotations in this security skill's documentation and are not counted as findings.

    Files scanned: 5. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "domain"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "subdomain"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "nist_csf"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "mitre_attack"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 59/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 85Steps. 26 steps, 1 vague phrases
    • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2487 tokens
    • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • -4Absolute local paths (C:\Users, /home/…): not portable
    • -42 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
    • -31 of 1 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 406: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 17 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 26 items
    • +4Has examples (9 code blocks)
    • +1License stated

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 71.