BB analyzing-command-and-control-communication
Analyzes malware C2 communication over HTTP, HTTPS, DNS, and custom protocols to reverse-engineer beacon patterns, command structures, data encoding, and infrastructure (primary servers, fallback domains, dead drops). Use after reverse engineering reveals network traffic needing protocol analysis or when building detection signatures for a framework like Cobalt Strike, Metasploit, or Sliver.
Analyzes malware C2 communication over HTTP, HTTPS, DNS, and custom protocols to reverse-engineer beacon patterns, command structures, data encoding, and…
As a process B 68/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: running it twice, progress reporting
How to improve
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 5
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 5
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:40Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)- Building network-level detection signatures for a specific C2 framework (Cobalt Strike, Metasploit, Sliver)
detector -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:45Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)**Do not use** for general network anomaly detection; this is specifically for understanding known or suspected C2 protocols from malware analysis.
detector -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:174Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)### Step 4: Identify C2 Framework
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:179Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)Known C2 Framework Signatures:
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:199Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- .NET-based C2 framework
Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "domain" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "subdomain" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "nist_csf" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "mitre_attack"
Process rating: all ten parameters 68/100
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 30Running it twice. 5 mutating operations with no state check
- 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (python) that frontmatter does not declare
- 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
- 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
- 100Steps. 27 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3399 tokens
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- -41 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
- -31 of 1 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
- +2Single-language instructions
- +4Description says when NOT to use the skill
- +3Description length 394: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 15 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 27 items
- +3Output format is stated explicitly
- +4Has examples (8 code blocks)
- +1License stated
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 82.