SKILLEMALL.ai

CB analyzing-malware-behavior-with-cuckoo-sandbox

Detonate malware samples in Cuckoo Sandbox to observe runtime behavior — process creation, file system and registry changes, network communications, and API calls — and generate behavioral reports for classification and IOC extraction. Use when a sample has passed static triage and needs dynamic/behavioral analysis, when mapping a full infection chain, or when building YARA/behavioral signatures from observed sandbox activity.

mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills Agent Skills author: mukul975 Apache-2.0 4 files · 1 script body ≈ 2 715 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 5 d ago

Detonate malware samples in Cuckoo Sandbox to observe runtime behavior — process creation, file system and registry changes, network communications, and API…

As a process B 65/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: failures and branches, running it twice

AnalyzerSecurityData and analyticstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
C
85/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
91
Quality 40%
76
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
65/100
Nearly there
Failures and branches w 10
0
Running it twice w 4
30
When it triggers w 12
50
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 5

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 5
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence SKILL.md:287
      Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (documentation of a security skill)
      [SET] HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\WindowsUpdate = "C:\Windows\System32\svchost_fake.exe"
      security skill
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:44
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      **Do not use** when the sample is a known ransomware variant that may spread via network shares in a misconfigured sandbox; verify network isolation first.
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:237
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)
      - **Cuckoo Sandbox**: Open-source automated malware analysis system providing behavioral reports, network captures, and memory dumps
      detector
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:238
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      - **InetSim**: Internet services simulation suite providing fake HTTP, DNS, SMTP, and other services for isolated malware analysis networks
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:247
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      **Context**: Static analysis reveals a packed executable with minimal imports and high entropy. The sample needs sandbox execution to observe unpacking, payload delivery, and C2 establishment.

    Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "domain"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "subdomain"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "nist_csf"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "mitre_attack"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 65/100

    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 30Running it twice. 9 mutating operations with no state check
    • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (web) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 100Steps. 32 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2715 tokens
    • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • -4Absolute local paths (C:\Users, /home/…): not portable
    • -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
    • -41 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
    • -31 of 1 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +4Description says when NOT to use the skill
    • +3Description length 430: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 16 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 32 items
    • +3Output format is stated explicitly
    • +4Has examples (8 code blocks)
    • +1License stated

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 76.