CB auditing-tls-certificate-transparency-logs
Monitors Certificate Transparency (CT) logs to detect unauthorized certificate issuance, discover subdomains via CT data, and alert on suspicious certificate activity for owned domains. Uses the crt.sh API and direct CT log querying based on RFC 6962 to build continuous monitoring pipelines that catch rogue certificates, track CA behavior, and map the external attack surface. Activates for requests involving certificate transparency monitoring, CT log auditing, subdomain discovery via certificates, or certificate issuance alerting.
Monitors Certificate Transparency (CT) logs to detect unauthorized certificate issuance, discover subdomains via CT data, and alert on suspicious certificate…
As a process B 68/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: failures and branches
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".
If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.
How to improve
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 2
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 2
-
medium Exfiltration
exfil-webhook-urlreferences/api-reference.md:25Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (documentation of a security skill)--webhook https://hooks.slack.com/services/XXX/YYY/ZZZ
security skill -
medium Exfiltration
exfil-webhook-urlscripts/agent.py:905Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)--webhook https://hooks.slack.com/services/XXX/YYY/ZZZ
quoted
Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "domain" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "subdomain" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "nist_csf" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "mitre_attack"
Process rating: all ten parameters 68/100
- 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
- 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (web, python) that frontmatter does not declare
- 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
- 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
- 100Steps. 61 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3711 tokens
- 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
- 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- -41 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
- -31 of 1 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
- +2Single-language instructions
- +4Description says when NOT to use the skill
- +3Description length 537: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 15 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 61 items
- +3Output format is stated explicitly
- +4Has examples (1 code blocks)
- +1License stated
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 82.