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CC building-c2-infrastructure-with-sliver-framework

Deploy and harden a Sliver C2 team server (BishopFox's Go-based adversary emulation framework) with multi-protocol listeners (mTLS, HTTP/S, DNS, WireGuard), redirectors, domain fronting, and multi-operator support for authorized red-team operations. Use when standing up resilient C2 for a red-team engagement or generating beacon/session implants that must survive blue-team detection.

mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills Agent Skills author: mukul975 Apache-2.0 8 files · 2 scripts body ≈ 1 805 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 5 d ago

Deploy and harden a Sliver C2 team server (BishopFox's Go-based adversary emulation framework) with multi-protocol listeners (mTLS, HTTP/S, DNS, WireGuard)…

As a process C 58/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, running it twice

GeneratorCloudflareInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) OpenClaw Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
85/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
91
Quality 40%
75
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
58/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
When it triggers w 12
20
Running it twice w 4
30
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 9

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 9
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/api-reference.md:1
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      # API Reference: Sliver C2 Framework
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/standards.md:7
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      | T1071.001 | Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols | Command and Control |
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/standards.md:8
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      | T1071.004 | Application Layer Protocol: DNS | Command and Control |
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/standards.md:9
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      | T1573.002 | Encrypted Channel: Asymmetric Cryptography | Command and Control |
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/standards.md:10
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      | T1090.002 | Proxy: External Proxy | Command and Control |
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/standards.md:11
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      | T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer | Command and Control |
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:51
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      - Familiarity with red teaming concepts and tools
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell SKILL.md:83
      Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (documentation of a security skill; the skill's own vendor host)
      curl https://sliver.sh/install | sudo bash
      security skillvendor-host
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege SKILL.md:83
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (documentation of a security skill)
      curl https://sliver.sh/install | sudo bash
      security skill

    Files scanned: 8. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "domain"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "subdomain"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "d3fend_techniques"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "nist_csf"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "mitre_attack"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 58/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 30Running it twice. 6 mutating operations with no state check
    • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, python) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 100Steps. 53 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1805 tokens
    • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • -43 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
    • -32 of 2 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 386: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 15 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 53 items
    • +4Has examples (17 code blocks)
    • +1License stated

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 75.