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CC building-c2-redirector-infrastructure

Build dumb-pipe and traffic-filtering C2 redirectors with nginx (proxy_pass) and Apache (mod_rewrite), deriving filter rules from a Malleable C2 profile, layering Let's Encrypt TLS, and applying OPSEC controls like domain fronting and UA/geo filtering. Use when standing up red-team C2 that must survive blue-team triage or ensuring only profile-matching implant traffic reaches the hidden team server.

mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills Agent Skills author: mukul975 Apache-2.0 5 files · 1 script body ≈ 2 716 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 5 d ago

Build dumb-pipe and traffic-filtering C2 redirectors with nginx (proxypass) and Apache (modrewrite), deriving filter rules from a Malleable C2 profile…

As a process C 56/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, running it twice

GeneratorGitHubOperations and projectstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) OpenClaw Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
86/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
93
Quality 40%
75
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
56/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
When it triggers w 12
20
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 7

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 7
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/standards.md:7
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      | T1090.002 | Proxy: External Proxy | Command and Control | The redirector is the external proxy node that hides the team server |
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/standards.md:8
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      | T1090.004 | Proxy: Domain Fronting | Command and Control | CDN fronting routes C2 through a trusted high-reputation domain |
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/standards.md:9
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      | T1071.001 | Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols | Command and Control | C2 is tunneled over HTTP/HTTPS shaped by the malleable profile |
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/standards.md:10
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      | T1573.002 | Encrypted Channel: Asymmetric Cryptography | Command and Control | TLS termination at the redirector encrypts the channel |
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/standards.md:31
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      - ired.team: Red Team Infrastructure Wiki
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:31
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      Redirectors come in two flavors. **Dumb pipes** (socat, iptables NAT) blindly forward a port and provide separation but no filtering. **Smart/filtering redirectors** (nginx `proxy_pass`, Apache `mod_r
      quoted
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:55
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      - The C2 framework's Malleable C2 profile (Cobalt Strike `.profile`, Sliver/Havoc HTTP profile) defining URIs, User-Agent, and headers.

    Files scanned: 5. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "domain"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "subdomain"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "nist_csf"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "mitre_attack"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 56/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 30Running it twice. 7 mutating operations with no state check
    • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (web, node) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 100Steps. 27 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2716 tokens

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • -42 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
    • -31 of 1 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 402: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 16 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 27 items
    • +4Has examples (11 code blocks)
    • +1License stated

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 75.