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CC conducting-domain-persistence-with-dcsync

Perform DCSync attacks by abusing MS-DRSR replication rights (DS-Replication-Get-Changes/-All) to impersonate a Domain Controller and extract KRBTGT, Domain Admin, and service account hashes for Golden Ticket forging, typically with Mimikatz. Use in authorized engagements after finding principals with replication rights, to establish long-term domain persistence, or to validate detections for replication abuse.

mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills Agent Skills author: mukul975 Apache-2.0 8 files · 2 scripts body ≈ 1 909 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 5 d ago

Perform DCSync attacks by abusing MS-DRSR replication rights (DS-Replication-Get-Changes/-All) to impersonate a Domain Controller and extract KRBTGT, Domain…

As a process C 56/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, failures and branches

ProcedureInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) OpenClaw Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
85/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
91
Quality 40%
75
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
56/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
When it triggers w 12
20
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 9

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 9
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/api-reference.md:40
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      | OS Credential Dumping: DCSync | T1003.006 |
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/standards.md:7
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      | T1003.006 | OS Credential Dumping: DCSync | Credential Access |
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/standards.md:19
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      - Atomic Red Team T1003.006 test procedures
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/standards.md:23
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      - APT28 (Fancy Bear) - DCSync for credential harvesting
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/standards.md:26
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      - Wizard Spider - Ryuk ransomware campaigns
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/workflows.md:15
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      └── Extract service account hashes (lateral movement)
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:51
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      - Familiarity with red teaming concepts and tools
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:68
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      - **T1003.006** - OS Credential Dumping: DCSync
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:187
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      | Service accounts | Lateral movement | Service access across domain |

    Files scanned: 8. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "domain"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "subdomain"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "d3fend_techniques"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "nist_csf"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "mitre_attack"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 56/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, python) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 100Steps. 41 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1909 tokens
    • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
    • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
    • low 10 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • -43 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
    • -32 of 2 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 414: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 15 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 41 items
    • +4Has examples (8 code blocks)
    • +1License stated

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 75.