SKILLEMALL.ai

DD conducting-internal-network-penetration-test

Execute an internal network penetration test simulating an insider threat or post-breach attacker to identify lateral movement paths, privilege escalation vectors, and sensitive data exposure within the corporate network.

mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills Agent Skills author: mukul975 Apache-2.0 8 files · 2 scripts body ≈ 2 402 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 5 d ago

Execute an internal network penetration test simulating an insider threat or post-breach attacker to identify lateral movement paths, privilege escalation…

As a process D 49/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, failures and branches

ProcedureSecuritytype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
D
75/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
75
Quality 40%
75
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
49/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 21

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 21
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence SKILL.md:226
      Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (documentation of a security skill)
      cat /etc/crontab
      security skill
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security assets/template.md:1
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      # Internal Network Penetration Test — Report Template
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security assets/template.md:8
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      | Assessment Type | Internal Network Penetration Test |
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/api-reference.md:1
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      # Internal Network Penetration Test — API Reference
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/api-reference.md:8
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      | impacket | `pip install impacket` | SMB relay, credential dumping, lateral movement tools |
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/api-reference.md:45
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      - [PTES Technical Guidelines](http://www.pentest-standard.org/index.php/PTES_Technical_Guidelines)
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/standards.md:1
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      # Standards — Internal Network Penetration Testing
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/standards.md:4
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      - PTES: http://www.pentest-standard.org/
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/standards.md:16
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      | Credential Access | OS Credential Dumping | T1003 |
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/standards.md:17
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      | Lateral Movement | Remote Services: SMB | T1021.002 |
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/standards.md:18
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      | Lateral Movement | Pass the Hash | T1550.002 |
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/workflows.md:1
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      # Workflows — Internal Network Penetration Testing
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/workflows.md:20
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      ├── Lateral Movement (PsExec, WMI, WinRM)
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/workflows.md:22
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      │       └── Credential Harvesting (Mimikatz, LSASS dump)
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/workflows.md:24
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      ├── Privilege Escalation
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:3
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      description: Execute an internal network penetration test simulating an insider threat
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:4
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      or post-breach attacker to identify lateral movement paths, privilege escalation
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:9
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      - internal-pentest
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:37
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      # Conducting Internal Network Penetration Test
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:41
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      An internal network penetration test simulates an attacker who has already gained access to the internal network or a malicious insider. The tester operates from an "assumed breach" position — typical
    • low Secrets in code secret-password-literal SKILL.md:276
      Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example)
      Step 2: Hash cracked offline — user: jsmith, password: Welcome2025!

    Files scanned: 8. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "domain"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "subdomain"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "d3fend_techniques"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "nist_csf"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "mitre_attack"
    • note edit-residue the text marks something as outdated (lines 79): check that old rules are not kept next to new ones — the full check reads the text for contradictions

    Process rating: all ten parameters 49/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 30Running it twice. 2 mutating operations with no state check
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 85Steps. 14 steps, 1 vague phrases
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2402 tokens
    • low 10 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • -43 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
    • -32 of 2 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 221: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 21 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 14 items
    • +4Has examples (10 code blocks)
    • +1License stated

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 75.