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CB conducting-social-engineering-pretext-call

Plan and execute authorized vishing (voice phishing) pretext calls to assess employee susceptibility to social engineering and evaluate security awareness controls.

mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills Agent Skills author: mukul975 Apache-2.0 8 files · 2 scripts body ≈ 1 690 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 5 d ago

Plan and execute authorized vishing (voice phishing) pretext calls to assess employee susceptibility to social engineering and evaluate security awareness…

As a process B 65/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: result and completion, running it twice, progress reporting

AnalyzerSecuritytype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) OpenClaw Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
88/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
96
Quality 40%
75
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
65/100
Nearly there
Result and completion w 14
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
Running it twice w 4
30
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 4

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 4
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/api-reference.md:51
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      - [PTES Pre-engagement Guidelines](http://www.pentest-standard.org/)
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/workflows.md:57
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      │   └── Penetration test notification (meta-pretext)
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:78
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)
      A pretext call (vishing) is a social engineering technique where an attacker impersonates a trusted authority figure over the phone to manipulate targets into divulging sensitive information, performi
      detector
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:219
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      - Social Engineering Penetration Testing by Gavin Watson (Syngress)

    Files scanned: 8. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "domain"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "subdomain"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "atlas_techniques"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "nist_ai_rmf"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "d3fend_techniques"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "nist_csf"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "mitre_attack"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "mitre_f3"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 65/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 30Running it twice. 4 mutating operations with no state check
    • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 85Steps. 40 steps, 1 vague phrases
    • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1690 tokens
    • low 11 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • -43 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
    • -32 of 2 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 164: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 17 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 40 items
    • +4Has examples (1 code blocks)
    • +1License stated

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 75.