SKILLEMALL.ai

CC configuring-ldap-security-hardening

Hardens LDAP directory services against credential harvesting, LDAP injection, anonymous binding, and channel-binding bypass by enforcing LDAPS, channel binding, and LDAP signing. Use when securing an LDAP or Active Directory environment against these attack classes or auditing directory service configurations for these vulnerabilities.

mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills Agent Skills author: mukul975 Apache-2.0 4 files · 1 script body ≈ 462 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 5 d ago

Hardens LDAP directory services against credential harvesting, LDAP injection, anonymous binding, and channel-binding bypass by enforcing LDAPS, channel…

As a process C 51/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, failures and branches

AnalyzerSecurityInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
C
87/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
97
Quality 40%
71
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
51/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 3

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 3
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:3
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      description: Hardens LDAP directory services against credential harvesting, LDAP
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:38
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      name: 'Brute Force: Password Spraying'
      quoted
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:57
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      Harden LDAP directory services against common attacks including credential harvesting, LDAP injection, anonymous binding, and channel binding bypass. Covers LDAPS enforcement, channel binding, LDAP si

    Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "domain"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "subdomain"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "nist_csf"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "mitre_attack"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "mitre_f3"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 51/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (python) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 100Steps. 18 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 462 tokens
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +4No input/output examples
    • -41 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
    • -31 of 1 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 338: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 7 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 18 items
    • +1License stated

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 71.