DB configuring-snort-ids-for-intrusion-detection
Installs, configures, and tunes Snort 3 to monitor network traffic for malicious activity using custom and community rulesets, preprocessors, and alert output plugins. Use when deploying network-based intrusion detection at key boundaries, writing custom Snort rules, tuning rulesets to reduce false positives, or integrating Snort alerts with a SIEM.
Installs, configures, and tunes Snort 3 to monitor network traffic for malicious activity using custom and community rulesets, preprocessors, and alert output…
As a process B 72/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: failures and branches, running it twice
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.
Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.
How to improve
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 11
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 11
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medium Dangerous commands
cmd-privilegeSKILL.md:90Privilege escalation / world-writable permissionssudo tee /etc/systemd/system/snort-iface.service << 'EOF'
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medium Dangerous commands
cmd-privilegeSKILL.md:116Privilege escalation / world-writable permissionssudo tee /usr/local/etc/snort/snort.lua << 'LUAEOF'
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medium Dangerous commands
cmd-privilegeSKILL.md:212Privilege escalation / world-writable permissionssudo cp snor…les/snor…les /usr/local/etc/snort/rules/
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medium Dangerous commands
cmd-privilegeSKILL.md:217Privilege escalation / world-writable permissionssudo python3 setup.py install
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medium Dangerous commands
cmd-privilegeSKILL.md:220Privilege escalation / world-writable permissionssudo tee /usr/local/etc/pulledpork3/pulledpork.conf << 'EOF'
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low Dangerous commands
cmd-background-processSKILL.md:105Starts a background / autostarted processsudo systemctl enable snort-iface.service
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:241Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)# Detect reverse shell on common ports
detector -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:243Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)msg:"LOCAL Possible Reverse Shell on port 4444";
quoted -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:253Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)msg:"LOCAL Mimikatz Lateral Movement via SMB";
quoted -
low Dangerous commands
cmd-background-processSKILL.md:325Starts a background / autostarted processsudo systemctl enable --now snort.service
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:406Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)| Trojan Activity | 12 | 1:1000001 (Reverse shell) |
Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "domain" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "subdomain" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "nist_csf" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "mitre_attack"
Process rating: all ten parameters 72/100
- 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
- 30Running it twice. 10 mutating operations with no state check
- 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
- 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
- 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
- 100Steps. 27 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3319 tokens
- 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- -41 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
- -31 of 1 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
- +2Single-language instructions
- +4Description says when NOT to use the skill
- +3Description length 351: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 16 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 27 items
- +3Output format is stated explicitly
- +4Has examples (8 code blocks)
- +1License stated
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 82.