BC configuring-windows-event-logging-for-detection
Configures Windows Event Logging with advanced audit policies to generate high-fidelity security events for threat detection and forensic investigation. Use when enabling audit policies for logon events, process creation, privilege use, and object access to feed SIEM detection rules. Activates for requests involving Windows audit policy, event log configuration, security logging, or detection-oriented logging.
Configures Windows Event Logging with advanced audit policies to generate high-fidelity security events for threat detection and forensic investigation.
As a process C 60/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, failures and branches
How to improve
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 3
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 3
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:167Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)Lateral Movement Indicators:
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:168Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)4648 + 4624(Type 3) - Credential-based lateral movement
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:194Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- **Not forwarding logs**: Local event logs are lost when endpoints are wiped by ransomware. Forward to centralized SIEM immediately.
Files scanned: 8. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "domain" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "subdomain" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "nist_csf" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "mitre_attack"
Process rating: all ten parameters 60/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
- 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
- 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
- 100Steps. 16 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1432 tokens
- 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
- 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- -43 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
- -32 of 2 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
- +2Single-language instructions
- +4Description says when NOT to use the skill
- +3Description length 413: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 12 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 16 items
- +4Has examples (5 code blocks)
- +1License stated
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 79.