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CC containing-active-breach

Executes containment strategies to stop active adversary operations and prevent lateral movement during a confirmed security breach. Implements short-term and long-term containment using network segmentation, endpoint isolation, credential revocation, and access control modifications. Activates for requests involving breach containment, lateral movement prevention, network isolation, active threat containment, or live incident response.

mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills Agent Skills author: mukul975 Apache-2.0 4 files · 1 script body ≈ 2 444 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 5 d ago

Executes containment strategies to stop active adversary operations and prevent lateral movement during a confirmed security breach.

As a process C 63/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: failures and branches, running it twice, progress reporting

ProcedureAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) OpenClaw Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
89/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
93
Quality 40%
82
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
63/100
Has gaps
Failures and branches w 10
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
Running it twice w 4
30
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 7

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 7
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/api-reference.md:59
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)
      # Block SMB lateral movement
      detector
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/api-reference.md:78
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (documentation of a security skill)
      sudo dd if=/proc/kcore of=/evidence/memory.raw bs=1M
      security skill
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:4
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      and prevent lateral movement during a confirmed security breach. Implements short-term
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:7
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      containment, lateral movement prevention, network isolation, active threat containment,
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:42
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      - Ransomware encryption has been detected and is actively propagating
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:63
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      - Map lateral movement paths using authentication logs (Windows Event ID 4624 Type 3 and Type 10)
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:74
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      Lateral Movement:      PsExec via svc-backup, RDP via admin-tier0

    Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "domain"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "subdomain"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "mitre_attack"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "nist_csf"
    • note edit-residue the text marks something as outdated (lines 190): check that old rules are not kept next to new ones — the full check reads the text for contradictions

    Process rating: all ten parameters 63/100

    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 30Running it twice. 4 mutating operations with no state check
    • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 100Steps. 63 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2444 tokens

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • -41 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
    • -31 of 1 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +4Description says when NOT to use the skill
    • +3Description length 440: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 15 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 63 items
    • +3Output format is stated explicitly
    • +4Has examples (3 code blocks)
    • +1License stated

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 82.