CC detecting-container-escape-attempts
Detects container escape at runtime across tooling - namespace manipulation, capability abuse, kernel exploits, sensitive host mounts, and anomalous syscalls - and explains which signals matter regardless of whether Falco, Sysdig, auditd, or an EDR is doing the collection. Use when deciding what breakout behaviour to monitor, investigating a suspected Docker or Kubernetes breakout, or comparing escape coverage across runtime sensors. Keywords: container escape, breakout, namespaces, CAP_SYS_ADMIN, privileged, hostPath, kernel exploit, syscall. Do not use for Falco rule syntax itself - use detecting-container-escape-with-falco-rules; for a static configuration sweep use performing-container-escape-detection.
Detects container escape at runtime across tooling - namespace manipulation, capability abuse, kernel exploits, sensitive host mounts, and anomalous syscalls…
As a process C 62/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, failures and branches, running it twice
How to improve
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 5
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 5
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/standards.md:6Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- **Tactic**: Privilege Escalation
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/standards.md:15Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)### T1068 - Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/standards.md:16Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- **Tactic**: Privilege Escalation
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low Dangerous commands
cmd-privilegescripts/process.py:204Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (string literal in code, not executed)"description": "Container can acquire new privileges via setuid binaries",
code literal
A further 1 matches are quotations in this security skill's documentation and are not counted as findings.
Files scanned: 8. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "domain" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "subdomain" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "d3fend_techniques" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "nist_csf" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "mitre_attack"
Process rating: all ten parameters 62/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 30Running it twice. 2 mutating operations with no state check
- 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
- 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
- 100Steps. 18 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2569 tokens
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- -43 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
- -32 of 2 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
- +2Single-language instructions
- +4Description says when NOT to use the skill
- +3Description length 716: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 15 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 18 items
- +4Has examples (7 code blocks)
- +1License stated
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 79.