CC detecting-privilege-escalation-in-kubernetes-pods
Detects and prevents privilege escalation inside Kubernetes pods by combining admission control (OPA policies), runtime monitoring (Falco), and audit log analysis of security contexts, Linux capabilities, and syscall patterns. Use when investigating a pod running as root or privileged, hardening workloads against in-pod escalation, or hunting for containers exceeding their intended scope. Keywords: allowPrivilegeEscalation, runAsRoot, capabilities, securityContext, OPA, Falco, audit log. Do not use for escalation through RBAC and service-account permissions - use auditing-kubernetes-rbac-privilege-escalation.
Detects and prevents privilege escalation inside Kubernetes pods by combining admission control (OPA policies), runtime monitoring (Falco), and audit log…
As a process C 64/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, failures and branches, running it twice
How to improve
For the model run — optional
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 21
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 21
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityassets/template.md:1Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)# Privilege Escalation Detection Checklist
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityassets/template.md:10Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)- [ ] Falco rules deployed for privilege escalation patterns
detector -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/api-reference.md:1Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)# API Reference: Detecting Privilege Escalation in Kubernetes Pods
detector -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/standards.md:1Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)# Standards - Detecting Privilege Escalation in Kubernetes Pods
detector -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/standards.md:7Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)| Escape to Host | T1611 | Container breakout via privilege escalation |
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/standards.md:8Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)| Exploitation for Privilege Escalation | T1068 | Kernel exploit from container |
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low Dangerous commands
cmd-privilegereferences/standards.md:9Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (documentation of a security skill)| Abuse Elevation Control | T1548 | Setuid/setgid binary exploitation |
security skill -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/standards.md:19Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- Section 5.4: Runtime monitoring for privilege escalation
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/standards.md:27Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)| Restricted | Heavily restricted | Non-root, drop all caps, no privilege escalation |
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/workflows.md:1Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)# Workflow - Detecting Privilege Escalation in Kubernetes Pods
detector -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/workflows.md:21Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)1. Install Falco with privilege escalation rules
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:4Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)Detects and prevents privilege escalation inside Kubernetes pods by combining admission
detector -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:42Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)# Detecting Privilege Escalation in Kubernetes Pods
detector -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:46Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)Privilege escalation in Kubernetes occurs when a pod or container gains elevated permissions beyond its intended scope. This includes running as root, using privileged mode, mounting host filesystems,
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:51Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)- When investigating security incidents that require detecting privilege escalation in kubernetes pods
detector -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:63Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)## Privilege Escalation Vectors in Kubernetes
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low Dangerous commands
cmd-privilegeSKILL.md:72Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (documentation of a security skill)| allowPrivilegeEscalation: true | setuid/setgid exploitation | Admission control |
security skill -
low Dangerous commands
cmd-privilegeSKILL.md:155Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (documentation of a security skill)Setuid/setgid binary executed in container
security skill
A further 3 matches are quotations in this security skill's documentation and are not counted as findings.
Files scanned: 8. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "domain" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "subdomain" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "d3fend_techniques" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "nist_csf" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "mitre_attack"
Process rating: all ten parameters 64/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
- 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
- 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
- 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
- 100Steps. 16 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2064 tokens
- 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- -43 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
- -32 of 2 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
- +2Single-language instructions
- +4Description says when NOT to use the skill
- +3Description length 616: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 13 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 16 items
- +4Has examples (6 code blocks)
- +1License stated
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 79.