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BB executing-active-directory-attack-simulation

Executes authorized attack simulations against Active Directory environments to identify misconfigurations, weak credentials, dangerous privilege paths, and exploitable trust relationships that could lead to domain compromise. The tester uses BloodHound for attack path analysis, Mimikatz for credential extraction, and Impacket for protocol-level attacks including Kerberoasting, AS-REP Roasting, and delegation abuse. Activates for requests involving Active Directory pentest, AD attack simulation, domain compromise testing, or Kerberos attack assessment.

mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills Agent Skills author: mukul975 Apache-2.0 4 files · 1 script body ≈ 3 159 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 5 d ago

Executes authorized attack simulations against Active Directory environments to identify misconfigurations, weak credentials, dangerous privilege paths, and…

As a process B 69/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: running it twice, progress reporting

ProcedureAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) OpenClaw Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
90/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
82
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
69/100
Nearly there
Progress reporting w 2
0
Running it twice w 4
30
When it triggers w 12
50
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 5

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 5
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:8
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      delegation abuse. Activates for requests involving Active Directory pentest, AD
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:100
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      ### Step 4: Credential Attacks and Lateral Movement
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:106
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      - **NTLM Relay**: Configure `impacket-ntlmrelayx -t ldap://<dc_ip> --escalate-user <user>` and coerce authentication to relay NTLM credentials for privilege escalation
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:108
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      - **Password spraying**: `crackmapexec smb <dc_ip> -u users.txt -p 'Winter2025!' --no-bruteforce` testing one password across all accounts to avoid lockouts
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:111
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      ### Step 5: Privilege Escalation to Domain Admin

    Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "domain"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "subdomain"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "d3fend_techniques"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "nist_csf"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "mitre_attack"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 69/100

    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 30Running it twice. 3 mutating operations with no state check
    • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 55Failures and branches. 1 branches
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (python) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 100Steps. 59 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3159 tokens
    • low The response is described with custom markup (31 tags): a typed call is more reliable

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • -41 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
    • -31 of 1 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +4Description says when NOT to use the skill
    • +3Description length 558: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 14 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 59 items
    • +3Output format is stated explicitly
    • +4Has examples (1 code blocks)
    • +1License stated

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 82.