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DC executing-red-team-engagement-planning

Build the foundational red team engagement plan - scope definition, Rules of Engagement (restrictions, communication plan, emergency stop procedures, legal authorization), MITRE ATT&CK-aligned threat profile selection, and operational timelines - producing an engagement brief for stakeholder approval. Use before any offensive testing begins, when scoping a full-scope, assumed-breach, objective-based, or purple-team engagement.

mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills Agent Skills author: mukul975 Apache-2.0 8 files · 2 scripts body ≈ 1 539 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 5 d ago

Build the foundational red team engagement plan - scope definition, Rules of Engagement (restrictions, communication plan, emergency stop procedures, legal…

As a process C 54/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, failures and branches

GeneratorInfrastructureSecurityOperations and projectstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) OpenClaw Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
D
73/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
75
Quality 40%
71
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
54/100
Has gaps
Failures and branches w 10
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
When it triggers w 12
20
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 25

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 25
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security assets/template.md:1
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      # Red Team Engagement Plan Template
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security assets/template.md:7
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      | Document Title | Red Team Engagement Plan |
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security assets/template.md:11
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      | Author | [RED TEAM LEAD] |
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security assets/template.md:21
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      [Describe the purpose of this red team engagement and the business drivers behind it]
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security assets/template.md:24
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      - [ ] Full Scope Red Team
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/api-reference.md:1
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      # API Reference: Red Team Engagement Planning
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/api-reference.md:13
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      | TA0004 | Privilege Escalation |
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/api-reference.md:17
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      | TA0008 | Lateral Movement |
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/api-reference.md:19
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      | TA0011 | Command and Control |
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/api-reference.md:28
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      ## Red Team Tools API References
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/standards.md:18
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      ## PTES (Penetration Testing Execution Standard)
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/standards.md:61
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      - Threat intelligence-led penetration testing
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/standards.md:68
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      - European framework for threat intelligence-based ethical red teaming
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/standards.md:71
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      - Phase 3: Red Team Testing
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/standards.md:76
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      - Intelligence-led red team testing standard
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/workflows.md:1
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      # Red Team Engagement Planning Workflows
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/workflows.md:8
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      2. Present red team capabilities and engagement type options
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/workflows.md:85
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      1. Distribute finalized ROE to all red team operators
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/workflows.md:96
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      1. Identify C2 framework requirements (Cobalt Strike, Sliver, Mythic)
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/workflows.md:127
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      Phase 4: Lateral Movement (Days 11-15)
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:3
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      description: Build the foundational red team engagement plan - scope definition, Rules
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:31
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      # Executing Red Team Engagement Planning
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:35
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      Red team engagement planning is the foundational phase that defines scope, objectives, rules of engagement (ROE), threat model selection, and operational timelines before any offensive testing begins.
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:40
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      - When conducting security assessments that involve executing red team engagement planning
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:47
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      - Familiarity with red teaming concepts and tools

    Files scanned: 8. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "domain"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "subdomain"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "nist_csf"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "mitre_attack"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 54/100

    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 30Running it twice. 3 mutating operations with no state check
    • 40Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (python) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 85Steps. 67 steps, 1 vague phrases
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1539 tokens
    • low 10 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +4No input/output examples
    • -43 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
    • -32 of 2 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 430: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 18 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 67 items
    • +1License stated

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 71.