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CB exploiting-idor-vulnerabilities

Identifies and exploits Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) vulnerabilities by manipulating object identifiers (numeric IDs, UUIDs, slugs) in API requests and URLs, using Burp Suite proxy history, Intruder, and the Authorize extension to test object-level authorization across sessions. Use during authorized penetration tests or bug bounty work to validate that CRUD endpoints and multi-tenant applications enforce per-object access control.

mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills Agent Skills author: mukul975 Apache-2.0 4 files · 1 script body ≈ 2 772 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 5 d ago

Identifies and exploits Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) vulnerabilities by manipulating object identifiers (numeric IDs, UUIDs, slugs) in API requests…

As a process B 68/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: when it triggers, progress reporting

ReferenceSecuritytype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) OpenClaw Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
86/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
92
Quality 40%
78
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
68/100
Nearly there
Progress reporting w 2
0
When it triggers w 12
20
Failures and branches w 10
55
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 8

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 8
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:8
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      penetration tests or bug bounty work to validate that CRUD endpoints and
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:42
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      - During bug bounty programs targeting broken access control vulnerabilities
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:46
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      - **Authorization**: Written penetration testing agreement for the target application
    • low Exfiltration net-credential-use SKILL.md:121
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (documentation of a security skill)
      curl -s -H "Authorization: $TOKEN_A" \
      security skill
    • low Exfiltration net-credential-use SKILL.md:125
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (documentation of a security skill)
      curl -s -H "Authorization: $TOKEN_A" \
      security skill
    • low Exfiltration net-credential-use SKILL.md:144
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (documentation of a security skill)
      curl -s -X PUT -H "Authorization: $TOKEN_A" \
      security skill
    • low Exfiltration net-credential-use SKILL.md:156
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (documentation of a security skill)
      curl -s -H "Authorization: $TOKEN_A" \
      security skill
    • low Exfiltration net-credential-use SKILL.md:160
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (documentation of a security skill)
      curl -s -H "Authorization: $TOKEN_A" \
      security skill

    Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "domain"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "subdomain"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "nist_csf"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "mitre_attack"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 68/100

    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 55Failures and branches. 1 branches
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (web) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 100Steps. 11 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2772 tokens
    • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • -41 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
    • -31 of 1 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 446: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 18 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 11 items
    • +3Output format is stated explicitly
    • +4Has examples (7 code blocks)
    • +1License stated

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 78.