SKILLEMALL.ai

CC exploiting-ms17-010-eternalblue-vulnerability

Detects and exploits MS17-010 (EternalBlue), a critical remote code execution flaw in Microsoft's SMBv1 implementation, using Nmap's ms-17-010 NSE script for detection and Metasploit's ms17_010_eternalblue/ms17_010_psexec modules for exploitation. Use during authorized red-team engagements or penetration tests against legacy Windows environments with unpatched SMBv1 to gain remote code execution.

mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills Agent Skills author: mukul975 Apache-2.0 8 files · 2 scripts body ≈ 720 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 5 d ago

Detects and exploits MS17-010 (EternalBlue), a critical remote code execution flaw in Microsoft's SMBv1 implementation, using Nmap's ms-17-010 NSE script for…

As a process C 54/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, failures and branches

AnalyzerSecuritytype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
C
82/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
90
Quality 40%
71
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
54/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 10

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 10
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/standards.md:6
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      | T1210 | Exploitation of Remote Services | Lateral Movement |
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/workflows.md:66
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      ### Credential Dumping
    • low Obfuscation obf-hex-escape-chain scripts/agent.py:18
      Escaped/char-code string obfuscation (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      b"\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"  # Extra
      quoted
    • low Obfuscation obf-hex-escape-chain scripts/agent.py:23
      Escaped/char-code string obfuscation (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      b"\x02\x50\x43\x20\x4e\x45\x54\x57\x4f\x52\x4b\x20\x50\x52\x4f"
      quoted
    • low Obfuscation obf-hex-escape-chain scripts/agent.py:25
      Escaped/char-code string obfuscation (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      b"\x02\x4c\x41\x4e\x4d\x41\x4e\x31\x2e\x30\x00"
      quoted
    • low Obfuscation obf-hex-escape-chain scripts/agent.py:26
      Escaped/char-code string obfuscation (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      b"\x02\x57\x69\x6e\x64\x6f\x77\x73\x20\x66\x6f\x72\x20\x57\x6f"
      quoted
    • low Obfuscation obf-hex-escape-chain scripts/agent.py:27
      Escaped/char-code string obfuscation (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      b"\x72\x6b\x67\x72\x6f\x75\x70\x73\x20\x33\x2e\x31\x61\x00"
      quoted
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:44
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      MS17-010 (EternalBlue) is a critical vulnerability in Microsoft's SMBv1 implementation that allows remote code execution. Originally discovered by the NSA and leaked by the Shadow Brokers in 2017, it 
      quoted
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:51
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      - When conducting red team exercises or penetration testing engagements
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:56
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      - Familiarity with red teaming concepts and tools

    Files scanned: 8. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "domain"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "subdomain"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "d3fend_techniques"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "nist_csf"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "mitre_attack"
    • note edit-residue the text marks something as outdated (lines 5): check that old rules are not kept next to new ones — the full check reads the text for contradictions

    Process rating: all ten parameters 54/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, python) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 100Steps. 33 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 720 tokens
    • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +4No input/output examples
    • -43 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
    • -32 of 2 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 399: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 12 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 33 items
    • +1License stated

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 71.