CB exploiting-prototype-pollution-in-javascript
Detects and exploits JavaScript prototype pollution vulnerabilities in client-side and server-side (Node.js) applications to achieve XSS, RCE, or authentication bypass through property injection into Object.prototype. Use when assessing a JavaScript/Node.js application for prototype pollution, especially where a merge, clone, or extend function accepts user-controlled keys.
Detects and exploits JavaScript prototype pollution vulnerabilities in client-side and server-side (Node.js) applications to achieve XSS, RCE, or…
As a process B 70/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: when it triggers, failures and branches, progress reporting
How to improve
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 3
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 3
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/api-reference.md:39Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)### Privilege Escalation
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:216Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)3. **Admin Privilege Escalation** — Pollute isAdmin or role properties to bypass authorization checks in Node.js applications
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:232Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)| 2 | POST /api/profile __proto__ | isAdmin property | Auth middleware | Privilege Escalation |
Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "domain" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "subdomain" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "nist_csf" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "mitre_attack"
Process rating: all ten parameters 70/100
- 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
- 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
- 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
- 100Steps. 16 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2142 tokens
- 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- -41 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
- -31 of 1 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 376: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 14 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 16 items
- +3Output format is stated explicitly
- +4Has examples (7 code blocks)
- +1License stated
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 78.