SKILLEMALL.ai

CC exploiting-server-side-request-forgery

Identifying and exploiting SSRF vulnerabilities to access internal services, cloud metadata, and restricted network resources during authorized penetration tests.

mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills Agent Skills author: mukul975 Apache-2.0 4 files · 1 script body ≈ 3 101 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 5 d ago

Identifying and exploiting SSRF vulnerabilities to access internal services, cloud metadata, and restricted network resources during authorized penetration…

As a process C 60/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: when it triggers, failures and branches, running it twice

ProcedureAWSKubernetesSecuritytype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
C
87/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
76
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
60/100
Has gaps
Failures and branches w 10
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
When it triggers w 12
20
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 5

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 5
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:42
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      - **Authorization**: Written penetration testing agreement including SSRF testing scope
    • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url SKILL.md:85
      Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)
      "https://target.example.com/api/fetch?${param}=…"
      placeholder

    A further 3 matches are quotations in this security skill's documentation and are not counted as findings.

    Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "domain"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "subdomain"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "nist_csf"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "mitre_attack"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 60/100

    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (web, git) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 100Steps. 11 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3101 tokens

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
    • -41 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
    • -31 of 1 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 162: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 18 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 11 items
    • +3Output format is stated explicitly
    • +4Has examples (7 code blocks)
    • +1License stated

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 76.