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CC exploiting-vulnerabilities-with-metasploit-framework

Uses the Metasploit Framework (msfconsole and its exploit, auxiliary, and post-exploitation modules) to validate that identified CVEs and vulnerabilities are actually exploitable, gather post-exploitation evidence, and confirm patch remediation. Use when performing vulnerability management validation, penetration testing, or post-patch verification and you need to prove real-world exploitability rather than rely on a scanner score alone.

mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills Agent Skills author: mukul975 Apache-2.0 8 files · 2 scripts body ≈ 1 663 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 5 d ago

Uses the Metasploit Framework (msfconsole and its exploit, auxiliary, and post-exploitation modules) to validate that identified CVEs and vulnerabilities are…

As a process C 58/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, failures and branches

ProcedurePostgreSQLSecuritytype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) OpenClaw Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
85/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
92
Quality 40%
75
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
58/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 8

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 8
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/api-reference.md:52
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      getsystem        # Privilege escalation
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/api-reference.md:96
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      ## msfvenom — Payload Generation
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/standards.md:4
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      - **PTES (Penetration Testing Execution Standard)**: http://www.pentest-standard.org/
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:34
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      The Metasploit Framework is the world's most widely used penetration testing platform, maintained by Rapid7. It contains over 2,300 exploits, 1,200 auxiliary modules, and 400 post-exploitation modules
      quoted
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:41
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      - When conducting red team exercises or penetration testing engagements
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:58
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      - **Post-Exploitation**: Modules for privilege escalation, persistence, pivoting
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:63
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      Unlike offensive red teaming, vulnerability management uses Metasploit to:
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:211
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      - Confusing vulnerability validation with penetration testing scope

    Files scanned: 8. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "domain"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "subdomain"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "nist_csf"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "mitre_attack"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 58/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
    • 100Steps. 43 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1663 tokens
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • -43 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
    • -32 of 2 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 441: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 18 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 43 items
    • +4Has examples (6 code blocks)
    • +1License stated

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 75.