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CC extracting-config-from-agent-tesla-rat

Extracts embedded configuration from Agent Tesla RAT samples, including SMTP/FTP/Telegram exfiltration credentials, keylogger settings, and C2 endpoints, via .NET decompilation and memory analysis. Use when analyzing a suspected or confirmed Agent Tesla sample and you need to recover its exfiltration channel and C2 configuration for threat intelligence or incident response.

mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills Agent Skills author: mukul975 Apache-2.0 7 files · 1 script body ≈ 1 596 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 5 d ago

Extracts embedded configuration from Agent Tesla RAT samples, including SMTP/FTP/Telegram exfiltration credentials, keylogger settings, and C2 endpoints, via…

As a process C 54/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, failures and branches

ProcedureTelegramDiscordOperations and projectstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) OpenClaw Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
86/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
94
Quality 40%
75
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
54/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 6

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 6
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/api-reference.md:60
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      description = "Agent Tesla keylogger/RAT"
      quoted
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:4
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      SMTP/FTP/Telegram exfiltration credentials, keylogger settings, and C2 endpoints,
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:16
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      - keylogger
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:45
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      Agent Tesla is a .NET-based Remote Access Trojan (RAT) and keylogger that ranked among the top 10 malware variants in 2024, impacting 6.3% of corporate networks globally. It exfiltrates stolen credent
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:52
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      - When conducting red team exercises or penetration testing engagements
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:197
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      - Keylogger and screenshot capture settings documented

    Files scanned: 7. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "domain"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "subdomain"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "atlas_techniques"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "nist_ai_rmf"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "nist_csf"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "mitre_attack"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 54/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (python) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 100Steps. 20 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1596 tokens
    • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • -43 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
    • -31 of 1 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 376: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 8 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 20 items
    • +4Has examples (1 code blocks)
    • +1License stated

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 75.