CC hardening-docker-containers-for-production
Hardens Dockerfiles, images, and per-container runtime settings against the CIS Docker Benchmark v1.8.0: non-root users, dropped capabilities, read-only root filesystem, seccomp and AppArmor profiles, and minimal multi-stage builds, validated with docker-bench-security, Hadolint, and Dockle. Use when preparing a container or Dockerfile for production, or auditing images and runtime flags against CIS Docker controls. Keywords: Dockerfile, USER, --cap-drop, read-only rootfs, seccomp, AppArmor, multi-stage, Hadolint, Dockle. Do not use for the Docker daemon's own configuration - use hardening-docker-daemon-configuration.
Hardens Dockerfiles, images, and per-container runtime settings against the CIS Docker Benchmark v1.8.0: non-root users, dropped capabilities, read-only root…
As a process C 64/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, failures and branches, running it twice
How to improve
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 4
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 4
-
low Dangerous commands
cmd-privilegeassets/template.md:25Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (documentation of a security skill)- [ ] setuid/setgid binaries removed
security skill -
low Dangerous commands
cmd-privilegereferences/standards.md:37Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (documentation of a security skill)- 4.8: Ensure setuid and setgid permissions are removed
security skill -
low Dangerous commands
cmd-privilegereferences/workflows.md:10Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (documentation of a security skill)Non-root USER No ADD, use COPY Sign image Remove setuid
security skill -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:38Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)Hardening Docker containers for production involves applying security best practices aligned with CIS Docker Benchmark v1.8.0 to minimize attack surface, prevent privilege escalation, and enforce leas
Files scanned: 8. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "domain" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "subdomain" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "nist_csf" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "mitre_attack"
Process rating: all ten parameters 64/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
- 30Running it twice. 5 mutating operations with no state check
- 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
- 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
- 100Steps. 26 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1570 tokens
- 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
- -43 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
- -32 of 2 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
- +2Single-language instructions
- +4Description says when NOT to use the skill
- +3Description length 625: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 16 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 26 items
- +4Has examples (6 code blocks)
- +1License stated
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 77.