CC hardening-docker-daemon-configuration
Hardens the Docker daemon (dockerd) through /etc/docker/daemon.json with user namespace remapping, TLS client authentication, seccomp profiles, and CIS Docker Benchmark controls such as icc, no-new-privileges, and live-restore. Use when securing a Docker host's daemon to prevent privilege escalation, breakout, or lateral movement, or when auditing daemon settings against CIS requirements. Keywords: dockerd, daemon.json, userns-remap, no-new-privileges, icc, live-restore, TLS socket. Do not use for hardening images and per-container runtime flags - use hardening-docker-containers-for-production.
Hardens the Docker daemon (dockerd) through /etc/docker/daemon.json with user namespace remapping, TLS client authentication, seccomp profiles, and CIS Docker…
As a process C 62/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, failures and branches, running it twice
How to improve
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 13
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 13
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low Dangerous commands
cmd-privilegereferences/workflows.md:24Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (documentation of a security skill)sudo cp /etc/docker/daemon.json /etc/docker/daemon.json.bak 2>/dev/null
security skill -
low Dangerous commands
cmd-privilegereferences/workflows.md:29Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (documentation of a security skill)sudo tee /etc/docker/daemon.json <<'EOF'
security skill -
low Dangerous commands
cmd-privilegereferences/workflows.md:78Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (documentation of a security skill)sudo mv /etc/docker/daemon.json.new /etc/docker/daemon.json
security skill -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:7Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)to prevent privilege escalation, breakout, or lateral movement, or when auditing daemon
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:40Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)The Docker daemon (`dockerd`) runs with root privileges and controls all container operations. Hardening its configuration through `/etc/docker/daemon.json`, TLS certificates, user namespace remapping
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:143Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)### Disable New Privilege Escalation
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low Dangerous commands
cmd-privilegeSKILL.md:151Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (documentation of a security skill)Prevents container processes from gaining additional privileges via setuid/setgid binaries or capability escalation.
security skill -
low Dangerous commands
cmd-privilegeSKILL.md:208Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (documentation of a security skill)sudo cp ca.pem server-cert.pem server-key.pem /etc/docker/tls/
security skill -
low Dangerous commands
cmd-privilegeSKILL.md:238Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (documentation of a security skill)sudo chown root:docker /var/run/docker.sock
security skill -
low Dangerous commands
cmd-privilegeSKILL.md:239Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (documentation of a security skill)sudo chmod 660 /var/run/docker.sock
security skill -
low Dangerous commands
cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-hostSKILL.md:252Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code) (documentation of a security skill)curl -fsSL https://get.docker.com/rootless | sh
security skill
A further 2 matches are quotations in this security skill's documentation and are not counted as findings.
Files scanned: 8. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "domain" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "subdomain" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "nist_csf" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "mitre_attack"
Process rating: all ten parameters 62/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
- 30Running it twice. 2 mutating operations with no state check
- 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
- 85Steps. 18 steps, 1 vague phrases
- 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1898 tokens
- 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
- low 13 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- -43 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
- -32 of 2 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
- +2Single-language instructions
- +4Description says when NOT to use the skill
- +3Description length 601: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 22 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 18 items
- +4Has examples (16 code blocks)
- +1License stated
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 79.