CC implementing-canary-tokens-for-network-intrusion
Deploys DNS, HTTP, and AWS API key canary tokens across network infrastructure to detect unauthorized access and lateral movement. Integrates with webhook alerting (Slack, Teams, email, generic HTTP) for real-time intrusion notifications. Provides automated token generation, placement strategies, and monitoring for enterprise network environments. Use when building deception-based network intrusion detection with Canarytokens.org and Thinkst Canary platforms.
Deploys DNS, HTTP, and AWS API key canary tokens across network infrastructure to detect unauthorized access and lateral movement.
As a process C 53/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, failures and branches
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".
If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.
How to improve
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 11
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 11
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medium Exfiltration
net-redirectable-api-keyscripts/agent.py:41Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another serverAPI key + configurable base URL from environment
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medium Exfiltration
exfil-read-secret-filesscripts/agent.py:545Reads credential / secret files (quoted — discussed, not commanded){"type": "aws_keys", "location": "/home/deploy/.aws/credentials",quoted -
low Exfiltration
exfil-webhook-urlreferences/api-reference.md:29Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)"webhook_url": "https://hooks.slack.com/services/T.../B.../xxx",
placeholder -
low Exfiltration
exfil-webhook-urlscripts/agent.py:740Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)python agent.py --action create_dns --email so…@….com --webhook https://hooks.slack.com/...
placeholder -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:4Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)to detect unauthorized access and lateral movement. Integrates with webhook alerting
detector -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:42Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- When planting fake AWS credentials, DNS beacons, or HTTP tokens to catch attackers during lateral movement
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low Exfiltration
exfil-webhook-urlSKILL.md:105Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)"webhook_url": "https://hooks.slack.com/services/T.../B.../xxx"
placeholder -
low Exfiltration
exfil-webhook-urlSKILL.md:131Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)"webhook_url": "https://hooks.slack.com/services/T.../B.../xxx"
placeholder -
low Exfiltration
exfil-webhook-urlSKILL.md:157Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)"webhook_url": "https://hooks.slack.com/services/T.../B.../xxx"
placeholder -
low Secrets in code
secret-aws-keySKILL.md:169AWS access key ID (placeholder value)aws_access_key_id = AKIA…PLE
placeholder -
low Exfiltration
exfil-webhook-urlSKILL.md:293Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)--webhook https://hooks.slack.com/services/T.../B.../xxx \
placeholder
Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "domain" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "subdomain" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "nist_csf" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "mitre_attack"
Process rating: all ten parameters 53/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 30Running it twice. 9 mutating operations with no state check
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (web, python) that frontmatter does not declare
- 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
- 100Steps. 53 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2891 tokens
- 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- -4Absolute local paths (C:\Users, /home/…): not portable
- -41 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 463: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 20 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 53 items
- +4Has examples (11 code blocks)
- +3All 1 scripts are documented
- +1License stated
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 77.