SKILLEMALL.ai

BB implementing-cloud-security-posture-management

Continuously monitor multi-cloud environments (AWS, Azure, GCP) for misconfigurations, compliance violations, and security risks using Prowler, ScoutSuite, AWS Security Hub, Microsoft Defender for Cloud, and GCP Security Command Center. Use for cross-cloud posture monitoring, CIS/SOC 2/PCI DSS compliance, or drift-detection workflows; not for runtime workload protection or application security testing.

mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills Agent Skills author: mukul975 Apache-2.0 5 files · 1 script body ≈ 2 827 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 5 d ago

Continuously monitor multi-cloud environments (AWS, Azure, GCP) for misconfigurations, compliance violations, and security risks using Prowler, ScoutSuite…

As a process B 65/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: failures and branches, running it twice

ProcedureAWSGoogle CloudAzureSecuritytype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
92/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
98
Quality 40%
82
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
65/100
Nearly there
Failures and branches w 10
0
Running it twice w 4
30
When it triggers w 12
50
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 2

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 2
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token SKILL.es.md:196
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
      "TargetId": "AWS-…ite",
      detector
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token SKILL.md:214
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
      "TargetId": "AWS-…ite",
      detector

    Files scanned: 5. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "domain"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "subdomain"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "nist_csf"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "mitre_attack"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 65/100

    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 30Running it twice. 4 mutating operations with no state check
    • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (python) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 100Steps. 23 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2827 tokens
    • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • -41 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
    • -31 of 1 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +4Description says when NOT to use the skill
    • +3Description length 405: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 15 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 23 items
    • +3Output format is stated explicitly
    • +4Has examples (7 code blocks)
    • +1License stated

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 82.