CC implementing-cloud-workload-protection
Implements cloud workload protection using boto3 and google-cloud APIs for runtime security monitoring, process anomaly detection, and file integrity checking on EC2/GCE instances. Scans for cryptomining, reverse shells, and unauthorized binaries. Use when building runtime security controls for cloud compute workloads.
Implements cloud workload protection using boto3 and google-cloud APIs for runtime security monitoring, process anomaly detection, and file integrity checking…
As a process C 51/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, failures and branches
How to improve
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 6
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 6
-
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/api-reference.md:42Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)| Reverse shell | `ss -tlnp \| grep ESTAB` |
-
low Dangerous commands
cmd-persistencereferences/api-reference.md:45Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (documentation table row; documentation of a security skill)| Cron persistence | `crontab -l; ls /etc/cron.d/` |
tablesecurity skill -
low Dangerous commands
cmd-cron-mentionreferences/api-reference.md:45Mentions editing / listing crontab (documentation table row; documentation of a security skill)| Cron persistence | `crontab -l; ls /etc/cron.d/` |
tablesecurity skill -
low Dangerous commands
cmd-cryptominerscripts/agent.py:62Installs or runs a cryptocurrency miner on the user's machine (detector / deny-list definition; string literal in code, not executed)"ps aux | grep -iE 'xmrig|minerd|cryptonight|stratum|nicehash' | grep -v grep",
detectorcode literal
A further 2 matches are quotations in this security skill's documentation and are not counted as findings.
Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "domain" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "subdomain" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "nist_csf" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "mitre_attack"
Process rating: all ten parameters 51/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, python) that frontmatter does not declare
- 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
- 100Steps. 13 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 399 tokens
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- -41 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
- -31 of 1 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 320: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 5 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 13 items
- +4Has examples (2 code blocks)
- +1License stated
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 75.