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CC implementing-continuous-security-validation-with-bas

Deploys Breach and Attack Simulation (BAS) platforms such as SafeBreach, AttackIQ, Picus, Cymulate, Pentera, or SCYTHE to continuously validate endpoint, network, email-gateway, SIEM, and incident-response effectiveness by safely emulating MITRE ATT&CK techniques. Use when moving beyond point-in-time pentesting to continuous control validation, or standing up automated adversary emulation.

mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills Agent Skills author: mukul975 Apache-2.0 8 files · 2 scripts body ≈ 2 234 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 5 d ago

Deploys Breach and Attack Simulation (BAS) platforms such as SafeBreach, AttackIQ, Picus, Cymulate, Pentera, or SCYTHE to continuously validate endpoint…

As a process C 51/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, failures and branches

AnalyzerSecuritytype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) OpenClaw Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
86/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
93
Quality 40%
75
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
51/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 7

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 7
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/api-reference.md:40
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      | T1021.002 | SMB Admin Shares | Lateral Movement |
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/standards.md:15
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      - **CIS Controls v8.1 Control 18**: Penetration Testing
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:6
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      MITRE ATT&CK techniques. Use when moving beyond point-in-time pentesting to continuous
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:41
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      Breach and Attack Simulation (BAS) is an automated, continuous approach to validating security control effectiveness by safely executing real-world attack techniques against production security infras
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:63
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      | Aspect | BAS | Penetration Testing | Red Team |
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:77
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      | Initial Access | Phishing payload delivery, exploit public apps | Email gateway, WAF, IPS |
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:80
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      | Privilege Escalation | Token manipulation, UAC bypass | EDR, PAM, SIEM |

    Files scanned: 8. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "domain"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "subdomain"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "d3fend_techniques"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "nist_csf"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "mitre_attack"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 51/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 30Running it twice. 5 mutating operations with no state check
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 100Steps. 28 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2234 tokens
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • -43 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
    • -32 of 2 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 392: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 16 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 28 items
    • +4Has examples (5 code blocks)
    • +1License stated

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 75.