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DC implementing-ebpf-security-monitoring

Implements eBPF-based security monitoring using Cilium Tetragon for real-time process execution tracking, network connection observability, file access auditing, and runtime enforcement. Covers TracingPolicy CRD authoring with kprobe/tracepoint hooks, in-kernel filtering via matchArgs/matchBinaries selectors, JSON event export, and integration with SIEM pipelines. Use when building kernel-level runtime security observability for Linux hosts or Kubernetes clusters.

mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills Agent Skills author: mukul975 Apache-2.0 4 files · 1 script body ≈ 2 118 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 5 d ago

Implements eBPF-based security monitoring using Cilium Tetragon for real-time process execution tracking, network connection observability, file access…

As a process C 53/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, failures and branches

ProcedureKubernetesSecuritytype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) OpenClaw Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
D
64/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
57
Quality 40%
75
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
53/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
When it triggers w 12
20
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 19

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 19
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-cryptominer scripts/agent.py:47
      Installs or runs a cryptocurrency miner on the user's machine (string literal in code, not executed)
      "xmrig",
      code literal
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-cryptominer scripts/agent.py:48
      Installs or runs a cryptocurrency miner on the user's machine (string literal in code, not executed)
      "minerd",
      code literal
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-cryptominer scripts/agent.py:49
      Installs or runs a cryptocurrency miner on the user's machine (string literal in code, not executed)
      "cpuminer",
      code literal
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-cryptominer scripts/agent.py:53
      Installs or runs a cryptocurrency miner on the user's machine (string literal in code, not executed)
      "ethminer",
      code literal
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-cryptominer scripts/agent.py:54
      Installs or runs a cryptocurrency miner on the user's machine (string literal in code, not executed)
      "nbminer",
      code literal
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/agent.py:329
      Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (string literal in code, not executed)
      "/etc/cron.d/",
      code literal
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/api-reference.md:57
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (documentation of a security skill)
      | `__sys_setuid` | false | Privilege escalation (setuid) |
      security skill
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/api-reference.md:57
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      | `__sys_setuid` | false | Privilege escalation (setuid) |
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-cryptominer references/api-reference.md:82
      Installs or runs a cryptocurrency miner on the user's machine (documentation table row; documentation of a security skill)
      | `Postfix` | String suffix | `values: ["xmrig"]` |
      tablesecurity skill
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege scripts/agent.py:160
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (detector / deny-list definition; string literal in code, not executed)
      """Generate a TracingPolicy for detecting setuid(0) and commit_creds calls."""
      detectorcode literal
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege SKILL.md:93
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (documentation of a security skill)
      sudo cp tetragon /usr/local/bin/
      security skill
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege SKILL.md:94
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (documentation of a security skill)
      sudo cp tetra /usr/local/bin/
      security skill
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:200
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      ### 6. Author TracingPolicy for Privilege Escalation Detection
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:202
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)
      Detect setuid/setgid calls that may indicate privilege escalation:
      detector
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:309
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)
      ### Detect Reverse Shell Connections
      detector

    A further 4 matches are quotations in this security skill's documentation and are not counted as findings.

    Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "domain"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "subdomain"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "nist_ai_rmf"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "atlas_techniques"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "nist_csf"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "mitre_attack"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 53/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 30Running it twice. 7 mutating operations with no state check
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, python) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 100Steps. 12 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2118 tokens
    • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • -41 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
    • -31 of 1 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 468: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 17 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 12 items
    • +4Has examples (15 code blocks)
    • +1License stated

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 75.