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CC implementing-honeypot-for-ransomware-detection

Deploys canary files, honeypot shares, and decoy systems to detect ransomware activity at the earliest possible stage. Configures canary tokens embedded in strategic file locations that trigger alerts when ransomware attempts encryption, uses honeypot network shares that mimic high-value targets, and deploys Thinkst Canary appliances for comprehensive deception-based detection. Activates for requests involving ransomware honeypots, canary files, deception technology for ransomware, or early ransomware alerting.

mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills Agent Skills author: mukul975 Apache-2.0 8 files · 2 scripts body ≈ 3 503 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 5 d ago

Deploys canary files, honeypot shares, and decoy systems to detect ransomware activity at the earliest possible stage.

As a process C 63/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: failures and branches, running it twice, progress reporting

AnalyzerWordExcelInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) OpenClaw Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
84/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
85
Quality 40%
82
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
63/100
Has gaps
Failures and branches w 10
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
Running it twice w 4
30
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 15

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 15
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security assets/template.md:1
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      # Ransomware Honeypot Deployment Template
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/api-reference.md:1
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      # API Reference: Implementing Honeypot for Ransomware Detection
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/api-reference.md:20
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      ## Ransomware Extension Indicators
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/api-reference.md:22
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      | Extension | Ransomware Family |
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/api-reference.md:66
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      - CISA Ransomware Guide: https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/standards.md:1
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      # Standards & References - Honeypot for Ransomware Detection
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/standards.md:21
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      - Elastic Ransomware Protection: https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/ransomware-in-the-honeypot-how-we-capture-keys
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/workflows.md:1
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      # Workflows - Honeypot for Ransomware Detection
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/workflows.md:25
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      |-- FSRM file screens for ransomware extensions
    • low Secrets in code secret-aws-key scripts/process.py:63
      AWS access key ID (placeholder value)
      ("000_Source_Code_Access_Keys.txt", "Repository Access Tokens\nGitHub Enterprise: ghp_XXXXXXXXXXXX\nAWS CodeCommit: AKIA…PLE"),
      placeholder
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:2
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      name: implementing-honeypot-for-ransomware-detection
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:3
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)
      description: 'Deploys canary files, honeypot shares, and decoy systems to detect ransomware
      detector
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:5
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      file locations that trigger alerts when ransomware attempts encryption, uses honeypot
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:7
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)
      for comprehensive deception-based detection. Activates for requests involving ransomware
      detector
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:8
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      honeypots, canary files, deception technology for ransomware, or early ransomware

    Files scanned: 8. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "domain"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "subdomain"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "d3fend_techniques"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "nist_csf"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "mitre_attack"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "mitre_f3"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 63/100

    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 30Running it twice. 11 mutating operations with no state check
    • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 100Steps. 26 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3503 tokens

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • -43 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
    • -32 of 2 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +4Description says when NOT to use the skill
    • +3Description length 516: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 14 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 26 items
    • +3Output format is stated explicitly
    • +4Has examples (7 code blocks)
    • +1License stated

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 82.