DC implementing-honeytokens-for-breach-detection
Deploys canary tokens and honeytokens (fake AWS credentials, DNS canaries, document beacons, database records) that trigger alerts when accessed by attackers. Uses the Canarytokens API and custom webhook integrations for breach detection. Use when building deception-based early warning systems for intrusion detection.
Deploys canary tokens and honeytokens (fake AWS credentials, DNS canaries, document beacons, database records) that trigger alerts when accessed by attackers.
As a process C 51/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, failures and branches
What is at stake
The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.
The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".
If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.
How to improve
- Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 3
-
high Exfiltration
exfil-read-secret-filesSKILL.md:81Reads credential / secret fileswith open("/opt/backup/.aws/credentials", "w") as f:
Medium and low: 2
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medium Exfiltration
exfil-read-secret-filesscripts/agent.py:134Reads credential / secret files (quoted — discussed, not commanded){"type": "aws_credentials", "location": "/opt/backup/.aws/credentials",quoted -
low Exfiltration
exfil-webhook-urlreferences/api-reference.md:13Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)"webhook_url": "https://hooks.slack.com/...", # optional
placeholder
Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "domain" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "subdomain" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "nist_csf" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "mitre_attack"
Process rating: all ten parameters 51/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 30Running it twice. 3 mutating operations with no state check
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (python) that frontmatter does not declare
- 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
- 100Steps. 13 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 411 tokens
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- -41 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
- -31 of 1 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 319: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 5 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 13 items
- +4Has examples (2 code blocks)
- +1License stated
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 75.