CC implementing-kubernetes-pod-security-standards
Chooses and applies the correct Kubernetes Pod Security Standard (Privileged, Baseline, Restricted) for a workload: what each profile forbids, how to map existing workloads to a profile, which securityContext fields must change, and how to plan a PodSecurityPolicy-to-PSS migration without breaking running pods. Use when deciding which pod security profile a namespace or workload should run under, auditing which workloads would fail Restricted, planning a PSP migration, or mapping pod security posture to a compliance control. Keywords: Pod Security Standards, PSS, Privileged, Baseline, Restricted, securityContext, runAsNonRoot, drop ALL capabilities, seccomp RuntimeDefault, PSP migration. Do not use for configuring the admission controller that enforces these profiles - use implementing-pod-security-admission-controller.
Chooses and applies the correct Kubernetes Pod Security Standard (Privileged, Baseline, Restricted) for a workload: what each profile forbids, how to map…
As a process C 64/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, failures and branches, running it twice
How to improve
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 2
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 2
-
low Dangerous commands
cmd-privilegereferences/standards.md:15Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (documentation of a security skill)| Capabilities | Cannot add beyond: AUDIT_WRITE, CHOWN, DAC_OVERRIDE, FOWNER, FSETID, KILL, MKNOD, NET_BIND_SERVICE, SETFCAP, SETGID, SETPCAP, SETUID, SYS_CHROOT |
security skill -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/standards.md:28Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)| Privilege Escalation | allowPrivilegeEscalation must be false |
Files scanned: 8. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "domain" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "subdomain" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "nist_csf" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "mitre_attack" - note
edit-residuethe text marks something as outdated (lines 5): check that old rules are not kept next to new ones — the full check reads the text for contradictions
Process rating: all ten parameters 64/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
- 30Running it twice. 3 mutating operations with no state check
- 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
- 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
- 100Steps. 12 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2000 tokens
- 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +3Description length 831: 120–800 characters recommended
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- -43 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
- -32 of 2 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
- +2Single-language instructions
- +4Description says when NOT to use the skill
- +4Structure: 16 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 12 items
- +4Has examples (8 code blocks)
- +1License stated
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 76.