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CC implementing-mitre-attack-coverage-mapping

Implement MITRE ATT&CK coverage mapping to identify detection gaps, prioritize rule development, and measure SOC detection maturity against adversary techniques.

mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills Agent Skills author: mukul975 Apache-2.0 8 files · 2 scripts body ≈ 2 108 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 5 d ago

Implement MITRE ATT&CK coverage mapping to identify detection gaps, prioritize rule development, and measure SOC detection maturity against adversary…

As a process C 60/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, failures and branches

AnalyzerData and analyticsInfrastructureSecuritytype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) OpenClaw Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
84/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
90
Quality 40%
75
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
60/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
When it triggers w 12
20
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 10

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 10
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/api-reference.md:30
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      | TA0004 | Privilege Escalation | T1078 Valid Accounts |
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/api-reference.md:32
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      | TA0006 | Credential Access | T1003 OS Credential Dumping |
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/api-reference.md:33
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      | TA0008 | Lateral Movement | T1021 Remote Services |
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/api-reference.md:34
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      | TA0011 | Command and Control | T1071 Application Layer Protocol |
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/standards.md:15
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      6. Privilege Escalation (TA0004)
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/standards.md:19
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      10. Lateral Movement (TA0008)
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/standards.md:21
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      12. Command and Control (TA0011)
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:168
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      25: Validated with adversary emulation (Atomic Red Team)
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:211
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      | Lateral Movement (RDP/SMB) | T1021 | High | Network segmentation visibility |
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:238
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      - Red team validation

    Files scanned: 8. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "domain"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "subdomain"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "nist_ai_rmf"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "atlas_techniques"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "d3fend_techniques"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "nist_csf"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "mitre_attack"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 60/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
    • 100Steps. 14 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2108 tokens
    • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • -43 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
    • -32 of 2 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 161: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 19 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 14 items
    • +4Has examples (8 code blocks)
    • +1License stated

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 75.