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Configures and operates the Kubernetes Pod Security Admission (PSA) controller that enforces Pod Security Standards: namespace enforce/audit/warn labels, cluster-wide defaults via AdmissionConfiguration, exemptions for usernames, runtime classes and namespaces, version pinning, and troubleshooting pods the controller rejected. Use when wiring PSA up on a cluster, setting cluster-wide default enforcement, exempting system namespaces, debugging why a pod was rejected or why enforcement is not firing, or reading PSA audit and warning output. Keywords: Pod Security Admission, PSA, admission controller, AdmissionConfiguration, pod-security.kubernetes.io labels, enforce audit warn, exemptions, kube-apiserver. Do not use for choosing which security profile a workload needs - use implementing-kubernetes-pod-security-standards.

mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills Agent Skills author: mukul975 Apache-2.0 8 files · 2 scripts body ≈ 2 143 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 5 d ago

Configures and operates the Kubernetes Pod Security Admission (PSA) controller that enforces Pod Security Standards: namespace enforce/audit/warn labels…

As a process C 64/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, failures and branches, running it twice

AnalyzerKubernetesSecuritytype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) OpenClaw Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
87/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
76
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
64/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
Running it twice w 4
30
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 5

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 5
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/api-reference.md:36
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      | `baseline` | Minimally restrictive — prevents known privilege escalation |
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/standards.md:8
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      | Restricted | All Baseline + non-root, drop ALL caps, seccomp required, restricted volume types, no privilege escalation |
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/standards.md:13
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      - 5.2.5: Ensure privilege escalation is not allowed
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:71
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      - **Minimally restrictive** - Prevents known privilege escalation
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:77
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)
      - Blocks: Everything in Baseline plus running as root, privilege escalation, non-approved volume types
      detector

    Files scanned: 8. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "domain"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "subdomain"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "nist_csf"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "mitre_attack"
    • note edit-residue the text marks something as outdated (lines 6): check that old rules are not kept next to new ones — the full check reads the text for contradictions

    Process rating: all ten parameters 64/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
    • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
    • 100Steps. 24 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2143 tokens
    • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
    • low 12 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +3Description length 830: 120–800 characters recommended
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • -43 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
    • -32 of 2 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +4Description says when NOT to use the skill
    • +4Structure: 26 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 24 items
    • +4Has examples (15 code blocks)
    • +1License stated

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 76.