DB implementing-ransomware-backup-strategy
Designs a ransomware-resilient backup strategy using the 3-2-1-1-0 methodology (3 copies, 2 media types, 1 offsite, 1 immutable/air-gapped, 0 restore errors), configuring RPO/RTO-aligned schedules, isolating backup credentials, and automating restore testing. Use when planning ransomware backup resilience or air-gapped/immutable backup architecture.
Designs a ransomware-resilient backup strategy using the 3-2-1-1-0 methodology (3 copies, 2 media types, 1 offsite, 1 immutable/air-gapped, 0 restore errors)…
As a process B 70/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: failures and branches, running it twice, progress reporting
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.
Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.
How to improve
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 18
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 18
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medium Dangerous commands
cmd-privilegeSKILL.md:176Privilege escalation / world-writable permissionssudo mkfs.xfs -b size=4096 -m reflink=1 /dev/sdb1
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medium Dangerous commands
cmd-privilegeSKILL.md:182Privilege escalation / world-writable permissionssudo chown veeamuser:veeamuser /mnt/veeam-repo/backups
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityassets/template.md:1Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)# Ransomware Backup Strategy Assessment Template
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/api-reference.md:1Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)# API Reference: Ransomware Backup Strategy Audit
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/api-reference.md:37Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)### Check Bucket Versioning (Ransomware Recovery)
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/api-reference.md:53Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)"remediation": "Enable versioning for ransomware recovery",
detector -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/api-reference.md:204Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)"issue": "No Object Lock — vulnerable to ransomware deletion",
detector -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/standards.md:1Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)# Standards & References - Ransomware Backup Strategy
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/standards.md:10Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)### NIST IR 8374: Ransomware Risk Management
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/workflows.md:1Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)# Workflows - Ransomware Backup Strategy
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/workflows.md:94Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)## Workflow 3: Emergency Ransomware Recovery
detector -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/workflows.md:97Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)Ransomware Incident Declared
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/workflows.md:106Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)|-- Scan backup files for ransomware artifacts
detector -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:2Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)name: implementing-ransomware-backup-strategy
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:3Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)description: 'Designs a ransomware-resilient backup strategy using the 3-2-1-1-0
quoted -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:6Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)automating restore testing. Use when planning ransomware backup resilience or air-gapped/immutable
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:11Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)subdomain: ransomware-defense
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:13Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- ransomware
Files scanned: 8. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "domain" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "subdomain" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "nist_ai_rmf" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "atlas_techniques" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "nist_csf" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "mitre_attack" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "mitre_f3"
Process rating: all ten parameters 70/100
- 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 30Running it twice. 6 mutating operations with no state check
- 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
- 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
- 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
- 100Steps. 31 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2786 tokens
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- -43 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
- -32 of 2 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
- +2Single-language instructions
- +4Description says when NOT to use the skill
- +3Description length 351: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 14 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 31 items
- +3Output format is stated explicitly
- +4Has examples (11 code blocks)
- +1License stated
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 82.