CC implementing-runtime-security-with-tetragon
Implements eBPF-based runtime observability and in-kernel enforcement in Kubernetes with Cilium Tetragon, monitoring process execution, file access, network connections, and syscalls, and blocking dangerous calls at the kernel level. Use when deploying Tetragon to detect or block syscalls such as ptrace, mount, and unshare, enforcing kernel-level policy, or adding low-overhead runtime detection to a cluster. Keywords: Tetragon, Cilium, eBPF, TracingPolicy, kprobe, enforcement, process lineage. Do not use for Falco-based detection - use detecting-container-runtime-threats-with-falco.
Implements eBPF-based runtime observability and in-kernel enforcement in Kubernetes with Cilium Tetragon, monitoring process execution, file access, network…
As a process C 62/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, failures and branches, running it twice
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.
Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.
How to improve
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 10
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 10
-
medium Dangerous commands
cmd-cryptominerscripts/process.py:134Installs or runs a cryptocurrency miner on the user's machine (string literal in code, not executed)"/usr/bin/cc", "/usr/bin/make", "/usr/bin/xmrig",
code literal -
medium Dangerous commands
cmd-cryptominerscripts/process.py:135Installs or runs a cryptocurrency miner on the user's machine (string literal in code, not executed)"/tmp/xmrig", "/usr/bin/minerd",
code literal -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityassets/template.md:70Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)| Privilege escalation via sudo | T1548.003 | Yes/No | | |
-
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/workflows.md:12Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)1. Create TracingPolicies for known attack patterns (container escape, privilege escalation)
detector -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/workflows.md:15Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)4. Validate detection accuracy with red team exercises
detector -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/workflows.md:69Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- TracingPolicy effectiveness review with red team
-
low Dangerous commands
cmd-cryptominerscripts/process.py:144Installs or runs a cryptocurrency miner on the user's machine (detector / deny-list definition; string literal in code, not executed)"severity": "HIGH" if info["binary"] in {"/usr/bin/xmrig", "/usr/bin/nsenter", "/usr/bin/unshare"} else "MEDIUM",detectorcode literal
A further 3 matches are quotations in this security skill's documentation and are not counted as findings.
Files scanned: 8. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "domain" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "subdomain" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "nist_ai_rmf" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "atlas_techniques" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "nist_csf" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "mitre_attack"
Process rating: all ten parameters 62/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 30Running it twice. 4 mutating operations with no state check
- 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
- 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
- 100Steps. 20 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1844 tokens
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- -43 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
- -32 of 2 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
- +2Single-language instructions
- +4Description says when NOT to use the skill
- +3Description length 589: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 22 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 20 items
- +4Has examples (10 code blocks)
- +1License stated
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 79.