BB investigating-phishing-email-incident
Investigates phishing email incidents from initial user report through header analysis, URL/attachment detonation, impacted user identification, and containment actions using SOC tools like Splunk, Microsoft Defender, and sandbox analysis platforms. Use when a reported phishing email requires full incident investigation to determine scope and impact.
Investigates phishing email incidents from initial user report through header analysis, URL/attachment detonation, impacted user identification, and…
As a process B 68/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: failures and branches
How to improve
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 5
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 5
-
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:75Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)- Automated detection identifies credential harvesting URLs or malicious attachments
detector -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:76Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- A phishing campaign targeting the organization requires scope assessment
-
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:276Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)disposition="True Positive - Credential Phishing Campaign"
detector -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:288Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)| **Credential Harvesting** | Phishing technique using fake login pages to capture username/password combinations |
-
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:316Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)Payload: Credential harvesting URL
Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "domain" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "subdomain" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "mitre_attack" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "mitre_f3" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "nist_csf"
Process rating: all ten parameters 68/100
- 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
- 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
- 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
- 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
- 100Steps. 26 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2482 tokens
- 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
- 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- -41 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
- -31 of 1 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
- +2Single-language instructions
- +4Description says when NOT to use the skill
- +3Description length 352: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 14 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 26 items
- +3Output format is stated explicitly
- +4Has examples (11 code blocks)
- +1License stated
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 82.