CC moving-laterally-with-netexec
Use NetExec (nxc) to validate credentials, enumerate SMB shares/users/policy, password-spray safely across lockout thresholds, execute commands, and dump SAM/LSA/NTDS credentials across SMB, WinRM, LDAP, MSSQL, SSH, and other protocol modules. Use during authorized internal penetration tests to find lateral-movement paths after obtaining credentials or hashes, or to conduct controlled password spraying and post-exploitation on in-scope hosts.
Use NetExec (nxc) to validate credentials, enumerate SMB shares/users/policy, password-spray safely across lockout thresholds, execute commands, and dump…
As a process C 61/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, failures and branches
How to improve
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 10
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 10
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/standards.md:7Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)| T1021.002 | Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares | Lateral Movement | NetExec authenticates to `ADMIN$`/`C$` and runs code on remote hosts |
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/standards.md:8Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)| T1110.003 | Brute Force: Password Spraying | Credential Access | `--continue-on-success` sprays one password across many accounts |
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/standards.md:9Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)| T1003.002 | OS Credential Dumping: Security Account Manager | Credential Access | `--sam` extracts local account hashes |
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/standards.md:10Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)| T1003.004 | OS Credential Dumping: LSA Secrets | Credential Access | `--lsa` extracts LSA secrets and cached domain creds |
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/standards.md:11Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)| T1003.006 | OS Credential Dumping: DCSync | Credential Access | `--ntds` replicates the domain database via DRSUAPI |
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:3Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)description: Use NetExec (nxc) to validate credentials, enumerate SMB shares/users/policy, password-spray safely across lockout thresholds, execute commands, and dump SAM/LSA/NTDS credentials across S
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:25Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)> **Authorized Use Only:** This skill is for authorized penetration testing, red-team engagements, and educational labs only. NetExec authenticates to, executes code on, and extracts credentials from
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:33Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)For lateral movement specifically, NetExec maps directly to MITRE ATT&CK **T1021.002 (Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares)**: it authenticates over SMB (port 445), reaches `ADMIN$`/`C$`, and use
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:37Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- During an internal network penetration test after obtaining one or more valid credentials/hashes, to identify every host where those credentials grant admin access.
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:38Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- To perform controlled password spraying against a domain while respecting lockout thresholds.
Files scanned: 5. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "domain" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "subdomain" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "nist_csf" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "mitre_attack"
Process rating: all ten parameters 61/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
- 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
- 100Steps. 26 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2450 tokens
- 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- -42 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
- -31 of 1 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 446: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 16 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 26 items
- +4Has examples (9 code blocks)
- +1License stated
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 75.