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CC operating-havoc-c2

Deploy a Havoc C2 team server with Yaotl malleable profiles, generate evasive Demon agents using indirect syscalls and sleep obfuscation, and run post-exploitation and pivoting operations. Use during authorized, rules-of-engagement-bound red-team engagements for adversary emulation requiring a full C2 lifecycle (server setup, evasive implant generation, tasking, and lateral pivoting).

mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills Agent Skills author: mukul975 Apache-2.0 5 files · 1 script body ≈ 2 429 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 5 d ago

Deploy a Havoc C2 team server with Yaotl malleable profiles, generate evasive Demon agents using indirect syscalls and sleep obfuscation, and run…

As a process C 51/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, failures and branches

GeneratorGitHubAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) OpenClaw Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
85/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
71
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
51/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 5

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 5
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/api-reference.md:49
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      ## Payload generation (GUI: Attack -> Payload)
    • low Secrets in code secret-password-literal scripts/agent.py:70
      Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example) (placeholder value)
      Password = "CHAN…0ng!"
      placeholder
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:25
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      > **Legal Notice:** This skill is for authorized security testing, sanctioned red-team engagements, and education only. Deploying a C2 framework or its agents against systems you do not own or lack ex
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:31
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      Havoc's behavior is driven by a **Yaotl profile** — a configuration language forked from HashiCorp's HCL — which defines the team server, operators, listeners, and Demon defaults. Because Havoc has be
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:38
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      - When demonstrating post-exploitation impact and lateral movement for a report

    Files scanned: 5. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "domain"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "subdomain"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "nist_csf"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "mitre_attack"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 51/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 30Running it twice. 6 mutating operations with no state check
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, python) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 100Steps. 35 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2429 tokens

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • -4Absolute local paths (C:\Users, /home/…): not portable
    • -42 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
    • -31 of 1 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 387: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 20 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 35 items
    • +4Has examples (9 code blocks)
    • +1License stated

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 71.