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CC performing-active-directory-compromise-investigation

Investigate Active Directory compromise by analyzing authentication logs, replication metadata, Group Policy changes, and Kerberos ticket anomalies to identify attacker persistence and lateral movement paths.

mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills Agent Skills author: mukul975 Apache-2.0 8 files · 2 scripts body ≈ 1 879 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 6 d ago

Investigate Active Directory compromise by analyzing authentication logs, replication metadata, Group Policy changes, and Kerberos ticket anomalies to…

As a process C 53/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, failures and branches

AnalyzerInfrastructureResearchtype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) OpenClaw Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
80/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
84
Quality 40%
75
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
53/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
When it triggers w 12
20
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 16

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 16
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security assets/template.md:41
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      | | Privilege escalation | | |
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security assets/template.md:42
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      | | Lateral movement | | |
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security assets/template.md:80
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      ## Lateral Movement Map
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security assets/template.md:147
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      ### Network Diagram with Lateral Movement Overlay
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/api-reference.md:11
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      | 4624 | Successful logon | Lateral movement (Type 3) |
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/api-reference.md:14
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      | 4728 | Member added to global group | Privilege escalation |
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/api-reference.md:15
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      | 4732 | Member added to local group | Privilege escalation |
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/api-reference.md:37
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      ## Lateral Movement Detection
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/standards.md:14
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      - T1003.006: OS Credential Dumping - DCSync
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/workflows.md:32
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      |-- Privilege escalation events
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/workflows.md:33
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      |-- Lateral movement chain
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:5
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      attacker persistence and lateral movement paths.
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:111
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)
      - SID History injection for privilege escalation
      detector
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:135
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      6. Map lateral movement paths through authentication chains
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:183
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      | **BloodHound** | Attack path mapping and privilege escalation analysis |
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:203
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)
      | SID-History Injection | T1134.005 | Privilege escalation |
      detector

    Files scanned: 8. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "domain"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "subdomain"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "mitre_attack"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "d3fend_techniques"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "nist_csf"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 53/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 30Running it twice. 6 mutating operations with no state check
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (python) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 100Steps. 41 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1879 tokens
    • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • -43 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
    • -32 of 2 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 208: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 19 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 41 items
    • +4Has examples (4 code blocks)
    • +1License stated

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 75.