CC performing-active-directory-penetration-test
Conduct a focused Active Directory penetration test using BloodHound, Impacket, Certipy, Rubeus, and NetExec to enumerate domain objects, discover attack paths, exploit Kerberos weaknesses, escalate privileges via ADCS/DCSync, and demonstrate domain compromise. Use when running an authorized AD pentest from a standard domain user foothold toward Domain Admin or Enterprise Admin.
Conduct a focused Active Directory penetration test using BloodHound, Impacket, Certipy, Rubeus, and NetExec to enumerate domain objects, discover attack…
As a process C 58/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, failures and branches
How to improve
For the model run — optional
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 11
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 11
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityassets/template.md:1Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)# Active Directory Penetration Test — Report Template
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low Secrets in code
secret-password-literalassets/template.md:18Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example)→ Cracked password: "SqlS…024!"
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/api-reference.md:1Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)# Active Directory Penetration Test - API Reference
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/standards.md:1Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)# Standards — Active Directory Penetration Testing
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/workflows.md:1Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)# Workflows — Active Directory Penetration Testing
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/workflows.md:22Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)├── Credential Harvesting
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:3Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)description: Conduct a focused Active Directory penetration test using BloodHound,
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:6Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)domain compromise. Use when running an authorized AD pentest from a standard domain
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:35Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)# Performing Active Directory Penetration Test
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:39Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)Active Directory (AD) penetration testing targets the central identity and access management system used by over 95% of Fortune 500 companies. The test identifies misconfigurations, weak credentials,
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:44Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- When conducting security assessments that involve performing active directory penetration test
Files scanned: 8. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "domain" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "subdomain" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "nist_csf" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "mitre_attack"
Process rating: all ten parameters 58/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 30Running it twice. 4 mutating operations with no state check
- 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
- 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
- 100Steps. 14 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2289 tokens
- low 10 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- -43 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
- -32 of 2 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 381: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 20 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 14 items
- +4Has examples (11 code blocks)
- +1License stated
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 75.