CC performing-authenticated-scan-with-openvas
Configure and execute authenticated (credentialed) vulnerability scans using OpenVAS/Greenbone Vulnerability Management (GVM) with SSH, SMB, or ESXi credentials to detect local vulnerabilities, missing patches, and misconfigurations on target hosts. Use when a host-level scan needs to log into systems for deep inspection, since authenticated scans typically surface 10-50x more findings than unauthenticated scans.
Configure and execute authenticated (credentialed) vulnerability scans using OpenVAS/Greenbone Vulnerability Management (GVM) with SSH, SMB, or ESXi…
As a process C 60/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, failures and branches
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".
If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.
How to improve
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 2
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 2
-
medium Exfiltration
exfil-read-secret-filesassets/template.md:15Reads credential / secret files (detector / deny-list definition)openvas_scan ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: /bin/cat /etc/shadow
detector -
medium Exfiltration
exfil-read-secret-filesSKILL.md:104Reads credential / secret files (detector / deny-list definition)<private><![CDATA['"$(cat /home/scan_user/.ssh/id_rsa)"']]></private>
detector
Files scanned: 8. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "domain" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "subdomain" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "nist_csf" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "mitre_attack"
Process rating: all ten parameters 60/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 30Running it twice. 3 mutating operations with no state check
- 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
- 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
- 100Steps. 15 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2106 tokens
- 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
- low 11 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- -4Absolute local paths (C:\Users, /home/…): not portable
- -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
- -43 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
- -32 of 2 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 416: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 21 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 15 items
- +4Has examples (11 code blocks)
- +1License stated
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 69.