CC performing-authenticated-vulnerability-scan
Plan and run authenticated (credentialed) vulnerability scans with scanners such as Nessus, Qualys, OpenVAS, or Rapid7 InsightVM, using SSH, SMB, WinRM, or SNMPv3 credentials to inspect installed software, patches, and configurations on Linux, Windows, and network devices. Use when a scan must catch vulnerabilities unauthenticated scanning misses, or when choosing and managing credential types for a credentialed scan.
Plan and run authenticated (credentialed) vulnerability scans with scanners such as Nessus, Qualys, OpenVAS, or Rapid7 InsightVM, using SSH, SMB, WinRM, or…
As a process C 63/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, running it twice
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".
If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.
How to improve
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 2
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 2
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medium Exfiltration
exfil-read-secret-filesSKILL.md:100Reads credential / secret files (documentation of a security skill)/bin/cat /etc/shadow, /usr/sbin/dmidecode, /usr/bin/find' | sudo tee /etc/sudoers.d/nessus_svc
security skill
A further 1 matches are quotations in this security skill's documentation and are not counted as findings.
Files scanned: 8. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "domain" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "subdomain" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "nist_csf" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "mitre_attack"
Process rating: all ten parameters 63/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
- 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
- 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
- 85Steps. 50 steps, 1 vague phrases
- 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1960 tokens
- 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- -4Absolute local paths (C:\Users, /home/…): not portable
- -43 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
- -32 of 2 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 421: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 21 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 50 items
- +4Has examples (5 code blocks)
- +1License stated
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 71.