BC performing-binary-exploitation-analysis
Analyze ELF binaries for memory-corruption vulnerabilities and build proof-of-concept exploits using pwntools, checksec, and ROPgadget for buffer overflows and ROP chains. Use when a penetration test or CTF challenge requires evaluating compiler mitigations (NX, ASLR, stack canaries, PIE, RELRO) or developing a working exploit to demonstrate impact.
Analyze ELF binaries for memory-corruption vulnerabilities and build proof-of-concept exploits using pwntools, checksec, and ROPgadget for buffer overflows…
As a process C 55/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, failures and branches, running it twice
How to improve
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 3
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 3
-
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/api-reference.md:73Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)| T1068 | Exploitation for Privilege Escalation |
-
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:5Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)when a penetration test or CTF challenge requires evaluating compiler mitigations (NX, ASLR,
-
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:413Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)"""Run the full exploit chain against a target (local or remote)."""
detector
Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "domain" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "subdomain" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "nist_csf" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "mitre_attack"
Process rating: all ten parameters 55/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
- 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, python) that frontmatter does not declare
- 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
- 100Steps. 21 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3540 tokens
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- -41 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
- -31 of 1 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
- +2Single-language instructions
- +4Description says when NOT to use the skill
- +3Description length 351: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 14 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 21 items
- +4Has examples (11 code blocks)
- +1License stated
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 79.