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CD performing-cloud-log-forensics-with-athena

Uses AWS Athena to query CloudTrail, VPC Flow Logs, S3 access logs, and ALB logs for forensic investigation. Covers CREATE TABLE DDL with partition projection, forensic SQL queries for detecting unauthorized access, data exfiltration, lateral movement, and privilege escalation. Use when investigating AWS security incidents or building cloud-native forensic workflows at scale.

mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills Agent Skills author: mukul975 Apache-2.0 5 files · 1 script body ≈ 3 554 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 5 d ago

Uses AWS Athena to query CloudTrail, VPC Flow Logs, S3 access logs, and ALB logs for forensic investigation.

As a process D 42/100 · Unfinished process — References files that are not bundled: [0-9]*

ProcedureAWSAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) OpenClaw Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
85/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
92
Quality 40%
75
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
42/100
Unfinished process
References files that are not bundled: [0-9]*
Tools and files w 18
0
Result and completion w 14
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

  1. The text references files that are not there: add them or drop the references.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 8

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 8
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/athena-forensics-reference.md:78
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    ### Lateral Movement Indicators (VPC Flow Logs)
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/athena-forensics-reference.md:84
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    ### Privilege Escalation Indicators (CloudTrail)
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/athena-forensics-reference.md:119
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    | 22 | SSH | Lateral movement |
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/athena-forensics-reference.md:120
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    | 445 | SMB | Lateral movement, ransomware |
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/athena-forensics-reference.md:121
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    | 3389 | RDP | Lateral movement |
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:6
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    lateral movement, and privilege escalation. Use when investigating AWS security
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:318
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)
    #### Detect Privilege Escalation Attempts
    detector
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:365
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)
    #### Detect Lateral Movement via VPC Flow Logs
    detector

Files scanned: 5. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning missing-ref reference to a missing file: [0-9]*
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "domain"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "subdomain"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "nist_csf"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "mitre_attack"

Process rating: all ten parameters 42/100

Will not run. References files that are not bundled: [0-9]*
  • 0Tools and files. 1 referenced file(s) missing: [0-9]*
  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 7 mutating operations with no state check
  • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
  • 100Steps. 12 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3554 tokens
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -42 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 378: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 18 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 12 items
  • +4Has examples (13 code blocks)
  • +3All 1 scripts are documented
  • +1License stated

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 75.