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CC performing-container-image-hardening

Harden container images by minimizing attack surface, stripping unnecessary packages, implementing multi-stage builds, configuring non-root users, and applying CIS Docker Benchmark recommendations to produce secure, production-ready images. Use when building production container images, when compliance requires CIS Docker Benchmark adherence, or when shrinking image size to reduce vulnerability exposure from unused packages.

mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills Agent Skills author: mukul975 Apache-2.0 8 files · 2 scripts body ≈ 1 933 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 5 d ago

Harden container images by minimizing attack surface, stripping unnecessary packages, implementing multi-stage builds, configuring non-root users, and…

As a process C 63/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: failures and branches, running it twice, progress reporting

ProcedureDockerKubernetesSoftware developmentAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) OpenClaw Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
85/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
88
Quality 40%
80
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
63/100
Has gaps
Failures and branches w 10
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
Running it twice w 4
30
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 8

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 8
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell scripts/agent.py:119
      Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (string literal in code, not executed)
      if upper.startswith("RUN") and "curl" in stripped and "| sh" in stripped:
      code literal
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host references/api-reference.md:16
      Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code) (documentation of a security skill)
      curl -sfL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/aquasecurity/trivy/main/contrib/install.sh | sh -s -- -b /usr/local/bin
      security skill
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/workflows.md:55
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (documentation of a security skill)
      - [ ] setuid/setgid bits cleared
      security skill
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege scripts/agent.py:110
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (string literal in code, not executed)
      if upper.startswith("RUN") and ("chmod 777" in stripped or "chmod -R 777" in stripped):
      code literal
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege scripts/agent.py:112
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (string literal in code, not executed)
      "check": "Overly permissive chmod 777",
      code literal
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege scripts/agent.py:115
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (detector / deny-list definition; string literal in code, not executed)
      "description": "chmod 777 grants world-writable permissions; use specific permissions",
      detectorcode literal
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege SKILL.md:132
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (documentation of a security skill)
      # Remove setuid/setgid binaries
      security skill
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege SKILL.md:255
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (negated — the text forbids it)
      [PASS] No setuid/setgid binaries found
      negated

    Files scanned: 8. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "domain"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "subdomain"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "nist_csf"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "mitre_attack"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 63/100

    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 30Running it twice. 4 mutating operations with no state check
    • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (python) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 100Steps. 20 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1933 tokens

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
    • -43 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
    • -32 of 2 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +4Description says when NOT to use the skill
    • +3Description length 428: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 15 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 20 items
    • +3Output format is stated explicitly
    • +4Has examples (7 code blocks)
    • +1License stated

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 80.