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CC performing-gcp-penetration-testing-with-gcpbucketbrute

Performs authorized GCP security testing using GCPBucketBrute to enumerate publicly accessible storage buckets, combined with gcloud CLI IAM enumeration to find privilege escalation paths and audit service account permissions. Use when penetration testing a GCP project for exposed buckets, overly permissive IAM bindings, or service account key exposure.

mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills Agent Skills author: mukul975 Apache-2.0 4 files · 1 script body ≈ 497 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 5 d ago

Performs authorized GCP security testing using GCPBucketBrute to enumerate publicly accessible storage buckets, combined with gcloud CLI IAM enumeration to…

As a process C 54/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, failures and branches

ProcedureGoogle CloudInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) OpenClaw Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
84/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
92
Quality 40%
71
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
54/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 8

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 8
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/api-reference.md:1
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      # GCP Penetration Testing API Reference
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/api-reference.md:60
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      ## Privilege Escalation Permissions
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/api-reference.md:62
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)
      Dangerous IAM permissions that enable privilege escalation:
      detector
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:5
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      find privilege escalation paths and audit service account permissions. Use when
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:6
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      penetration testing a GCP project for exposed buckets, overly permissive IAM bindings,
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:12
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      - cloud-pentesting
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:41
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      # Performing GCP Penetration Testing with GCPBucketBrute
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:45
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      This skill covers Google Cloud Platform security testing using GCPBucketBrute for storage bucket enumeration and access permission testing, combined with gcloud CLI IAM enumeration to identify privile

    Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "domain"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "subdomain"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "nist_ai_rmf"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "atlas_techniques"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "nist_csf"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "mitre_attack"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 54/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (python) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 100Steps. 19 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 497 tokens
    • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +4No input/output examples
    • -41 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
    • -31 of 1 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 355: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 6 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 19 items
    • +1License stated

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 71.